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ABSTRACT 
 
 Agency theory stipulates that managerial effort is important to shareholders and 
costly for managers to provide. Executives may provide sub-optimal levels of effort 
because shareholders cannot easily observe the day-to-day actions of managers and 
therefore have difficulties properly monitoring the effort provided by firm management. 
Researchers also face the challenge of measuring executive effort. In this dissertation, I 
use an observable measure of leisure consumption to proxy for the effort provided by 
executives to study the impact of executive effort on firm outcomes.  
 In the first essay, I focus on Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”) and the impact of 
their effort on firm performance. I document that equity-based incentives are an 
important determinant of the effort provided by CEOs and that CEO effort impacts the 
operating performance of firms, which is highly consistent with agency theory. A series 
of robustness tests suggest the relation is causal. In the second essay, I focus on the effort 
provided by Chief Financial Officers (“CFOs”) and its impact on financial reporting 
quality. I document that CFO effort impacts the financial reporting quality of firms and 
that this variation in reporting quality is observed by auditors and market participants. 
Overall, these results support the importance of executive effort in determining firm 
performance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 This dissertation is composed of two essays that analyze the importance of 
executive effort in the context of large, publically traded corporations. Executives are 
thought to create value by exerting effort and the difficulty in observing the effort of 
managers is a central element of the agency-problem between managers and shareholders. 
In these essays, I proxy for the effort provided by managers using an observable measure 
of leisure consumption: the number of golf rounds played by the executive in a year. I 
utilize the United States Golf Association’s (“USGA”) handicap system to determine the 
frequency of golf for CEOs and CFOs that maintain a golf handicap through the USGA. 
This data provides direct insight into the day-to-day leisure consumption of these 
executives. Given that time is a finite resource, I assume that effort is reduced as leisure 
consumption increases. 
 In the first essay, I focus on CEOs to study the relation between incentives and 
effort as well as the impact of effort on firm performance. I begin by looking at the 
determinants of CEO golf frequency to establish the importance of equity-based 
incentives in a CEO’s effort/leisure choice. Consistent with agency theory, I find that 
stronger incentives lead to greater effort. Next, I analyze the relation between CEO 
leisure and firm performance and find that higher leisure consumption is correlated with 
weaker firm performance. This relationship is strongest in industries where CEO effort is 
thought to be most important, which helps establish causality. Further robustness tests 
include an instrumental variable analysis and first-difference framework. Finally, I look 
for evidence of monitoring by directors and find that new CEOs get compensation with a 
stronger incentive component and are more likely to turnover after years when they 
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provide less effort. These findings are consistent with the resolution of information 
asymmetries between the CEO and directors early in the CEOs career. 
 In the second essay, I turn my focus to CFOs and study the relation between CFO 
effort and financial reporting quality. CFOs are responsible for the management of the 
financial reporting process and prior studies have linked CFO characteristics to financial 
reporting quality, but there are no studies that directly link effort to financial reporting 
quality. I measure financial reporting quality using information from the financial 
statements, the auditor, analysts, and market participants. I document that CFO effort is 
an important determinant of the financial reporting quality of the firm. This result is 
consistent with the importance of the CFO in the financial reporting process and the 
consequence of managerial effort on firm outputs. The results do not appear to be driven 
by unobservable firm culture or managerial skill. 
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Chapter 2: FORE! 
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Abstract 
 
 Agency and corporate governance theory assume that CEO effort is important for 
firm profitability and performance, costly for the CEO to provide and difficult for 
shareholders to monitor (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). We empirically analyze the 
relationship between CEO effort, corporate governance and firm performance using a 
detailed panel of golfing records for a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs from 2008 to 2012. 
Consistent with the predictions of fundamental models of agency theory, we find that 
higher CEO ownership and stronger incentives are associated with lower leisure 
consumption and that high levels of CEO leisure correspond to lower firm profitability 
and firm-value. We also document that past leisure consumption is an important 
determinant of the structure of CEO compensation – particularly when the CEO is new – 
suggesting that boards learn about CEO preferences over time and adjust their incentives 
accordingly. 
 
I. Introduction 
  
 This paper tests a fundamental component of agency theory – the relationship 
between the incentives and monitoring imposed by the principal and the effort provided 
by the agent.1 In the context of a corporation, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that a 
large potential cost of the agency problem faced by shareholders is lack of effort by the 
CEO, which can reduce firm value through under investment or poor investment choice. 
                                                 
1
 Numerous models include effort as a costly good provided by the agent that is important to the principal; 
see Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Haubrich, 1994; Baker and Hall, 1998; Edmans, Gabaix, 
and Landier, 2009. 
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An underlying notion of the agency problem is that effort is costly for the agent to 
provide, is difficult to monitor, and provides value to the principal. 
 A key prediction of agency theory is that deviations from value-maximizing effort 
can be reduced through financial incentives and monitoring by the principal, essentially 
the raison d'être for corporate governance. However, CEO effort and leisure are difficult 
to observe and measure, so there is very little direct evidence of the effectiveness of 
monitoring and incentives in inducing effort. Instead, the existing literature has relied 
upon firm value and performance to measure CEO effort, which is problematic because 
these firm-level outcomes represent extremely noisy measures of CEO effort.2 To our 
knowledge, this study is the first to measure and exploit the different levels of leisure 
consumption for a broad sample of CEOs to determine the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms, the relation between leisure and firm performance & value, and 
the ability of the directors to monitor leisure and adjust incentives. 
 We evaluate the primary predictions of agency theory using a unique database of 
CEOs’ golfing habits to proxy for their levels of leisure consumption. By studying this 
rich and detailed record of CEO golfing activity, we are able to document that financial 
incentives are an important determinant of how frequently a CEO is on the golf course. 
We also find that high levels of golfing activity are associated with weaker operating 
performance and lower firm value, which confirms the importance of CEO effort. 
Robustness tests confirm that the relationship between performance and leisure 
consumption is not driven by unobserved omitted variables. We show that directors 
adjust their CEOs’ incentives in response to revealed preferences for leisure and that this 
                                                 
2
 See Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck, Shliefer, Vishney, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Woidtke, 
2002; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011.  
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adjustment is primarily made to the incentives of new CEOs, a group where directors 
have the least information regarding preferences. Additionally, we find that CEO 
turnover is related to prior golf frequency and the relationship is driven by CEOs with 
short tenures. The observed adjustment of incentives and CEO turnover is consistent with 
the resolution of information asymmetries over time.   
 To perform the analyses in this study, we utilize a hand-collected dataset of golf 
records for 363 S&P 1500 CEOs extracted from a database of golf records maintained by 
the United States Golf Association (“USGA”). This database contains records for each 
round recorded in the system by participating golfers from 2008 to 2012.3 For each round 
of golf the database contains the month and year, difficulty of the course, the player’s 
score, the method through which the round was entered into the database, and if the 
round was at the golfer’s home course. Additionally, the database lists the course 
memberships of each golfer. This database is used to calculate golfers’ handicaps and 
online access is provided to others in the golfing community.4  
 We use the frequency of golf play as a proxy for the amount time allocated to 
leisure consumption by the CEO. We argue that golf frequency measures leisure 
consumption because each round of golf consumes a significant amount of an executive’s 
time and prior studies show that CEO golfing activity is correlated with other forms of 
leisure consumption, such as the time spent at their vacation homes (Yermack, 2006). 
The distribution of CEO golf frequency is shown in Figure 1, which demonstrates that 
many CEOs spend a large amount of time at the golf course. Based on definitions 
                                                 
3
 A round of golf is played over 18 holes. The maximum number of players in a group is generally 4 and it 
takes approximately 4 hours to complete the round. 
4
 A golfer’s handicap is a numerical representation of golf skill and lower handicaps are assigned to better 
golfers. Handicaps are calculated based on prior scores and are used as a mechanism to adjust scores for 
golfers with different skill levels when they are competing. 
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provided by the USGA, more than 57% of the CEOs in the sample are classified as “Core” 
or “Avid” golfers. Although we treat all golf by CEOs as leisure consumption, there are 
certainly rounds that have a valid business purpose, which is reflected in the commonly 
held notion that “business gets done on the golf course”. However, the distribution of golf 
frequency has a long tail, with the top quartile (decile) playing a minimum of 22 (37) 
rounds per year. In fact, some CEOs in the database play in excess of 100 rounds in a 
calendar year! This observed behavior appears difficult to justify as value maximizing, 
but is consistent with an agency problem. Additionally, we document a 42% increase in 
the frequency of golf in the year following a CEO’s departure from the firm, suggesting 
that CEOs enjoy golf as a hobby and are not merely using it for business purposes. We 
provide a more detailed discussion of golf as a measure of leisure consumption in Section 
III.   
 The separation of ownership and control is a hallmark of the modern corporation, 
leading to a potentially strong agency conflict between executives and shareholders.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency problem faced by shareholders can be 
mitigated by establishing incentives for the manager that align her interests with those of 
shareholders and by monitoring the managers’ activities. In the modern corporation, these 
incentives are primarily established through stock and options awarded to the CEO 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995). In this study, we find evidence that higher 
levels of equity-based incentives are associated with lower leisure consumption by the 
CEO, providing some of the first direct evidence of the efficacy of corporate governance 
in the labor/leisure decision of CEOs. A simple univariate comparison reveals the 
relationship between equity-based incentives and time spent playing golf: the average 
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ownership percentage for CEOs in the bottom quartile of golf frequency is 1.82%, which 
is significantly higher than the 1.09% observed for CEOs in the top quartile.5  When 
investigating these relationships in a multivariate framework, we find that CEOs play 
fewer rounds of golf when they have higher stock ownership or stronger wealth 
performance sensitivity. 
 We document that high levels of leisure are associated with lower firm 
performance, which supports the argument that CEO effort is an important determinant of 
firm performance. In the years where the CEO played 22 or more rounds, which 
corresponds to the top quartile of observations, the mean return on assets (ROA) is more 
than 100 basis points lower than firms where the CEO played less frequently. This result 
is economically significant as the sample mean ROA is just over 5.3%.  
 A potential concern regarding the relationship between leisure consumption and 
performance is that an unobserved variable is responsible for both high leisure 
consumption and poor firm performance. In order to address this potential endogeneity 
bias in our study we perform two separate analyses. The first approach uses a first-
difference framework in order to alleviate concerns that unobserved CEO quality might 
be driving the results that we document. For example, low quality CEOs may choose to 
allocate large amounts of time to golf because the marginal productivity of their labor is 
low. The second analysis uses a two-stage least squares regression approach in which we 
specify an instrument for the level of golf play. The instrument that we employ is the 
number of clear days in the CEO’s home state. Results from both analyses support our 
original findings that CEO leisure is negatively related to firm performance. 
                                                 
5
 The bottom quartile corresponds to observations where the CEO recorded less than 3 rounds in the fiscal 
year; the top quartile consists of observations where the CEO recorded 22 or more rounds during the fiscal 
year. 
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 A second potential concern is causality. It is certainly possible that CEOs choose 
to play more golf because they expect firm performance to be poor. To address this 
concern, we look at the effect of high levels of leisure in industries where CEO effort is 
predicted to be most valuable. There should be no differential effect across industries if 
CEOs choose to play more golf because performance is expected to be poor. The existing 
literature documents stronger incentives for CEOs in high growth industries (Smith and 
Watts, 1992), which suggests that CEO effort is most valuable when the industry is 
growing rapidly. Consistent with this prediction, we document that firms in high growth 
drive the relationship between CEO leisure consumption and firm performance. This is 
not consistent with the notion that CEOs react to poor expected performance by 
allocating more time to leisure consumption. 
Finally, we contribute to existing literature that is focused on the information 
asymmetries that exist between new CEOs and directors and the process by which these 
asymmetries are resolved. Harris & Holmstrom (1982) provide a model where 
information asymmetries between principals and agents are reduced as the principals 
observe the agents over a number of periods.  Zajac (1990) argues that superior 
performance of inside hire CEOs is consistent with lower information asymmetries when 
the new CEO is promoted internally. Zhang (2008) provides further support for this 
argument, as newly hired CEOs are more likely to be terminated if they were external 
candidates, even when controlling for the performance of the firm. We find evidence that 
directors react to preferences revealed by new CEOs by analyzing adjustments to CEO 
equity-based incentives.  Specifically, we document that new CEOs receive subsequent 
compensation that features significantly higher pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) 
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after they reveal strong preferences for leisure consumption. The relationship between 
past leisure consumption and PPS is significantly weaker for CEOs with longer tenures, 
which could indicate weaker monitoring by the board as the CEO nominates friendly 
directors. 
 This is the first study to empirically measure CEO leisure, which provides direct 
insight into the effort that CEOs allocate to managing firm resources. This study goes 
beyond the existing literature by directly linking CEO leisure, corporate governance, and 
firm performance for a broad sample of large firms. These findings improve our 
understanding of the importance of corporate governance and the cost of the agency 
problem. This paper supports and extends two recent studies that provide insight into the 
relationship between CEO effort and firm performance by identifying external shocks 
that distract the CEO. Both Bennedsen et al. (2007) and Malmendier and Tate (2009) 
document that external distractions are associated with lower firm performance, but the 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) study is limited to extremely small, Danish firms and the 
evidence in Malmendier and Tate (2009) relating firm performance to CEO distractions is 
indirect.  
 This paper continues as follows. In Section II, we discuss the related literature, 
explain the underlying assumptions and develop the hypotheses that are tested. Section 
III discusses the data collection, the merits of using golf frequency to measure leisure, 
and summary statistics. Multivariate results are discussed in Section IV and Section V 
concludes. 
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II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
 Many economic models assume that CEO effort is an important determinant of 
firm performance and costly for the CEO to provide, yet the existing literature provides 
little evidence regarding the relationship between CEO effort, governance mechanisms, 
and firm performance.6  The lack of empirical research is driven by the difficulty in 
measuring the effort provided by the CEO. We use a measure of CEOs’ leisure 
consumption to proxy for the effort they provide, which allows us to empirically test 
theoretical predictions regarding the ability of governance mechanisms to influence CEO 
effort and the relationship between effort and firm performance.   
An essential assumption of this study is that leisure is inversely related to the 
effort allocated to managing the assets and investments of the firm. Time is a finite 
resource and the time allocated to playing golf directly reduces the time available to 
devote to the firm. Additionally, playing a significant amount of golf may reveal an 
overall preference for leisure consumption, such that CEO golf frequency may be 
positively correlated with the time allocated to other hobbies or vacations.7,8   
 The primary tool used to align the interest of managers with shareholders is equity 
ownership, through either stock or options. Early research into the effectiveness of equity 
based incentives focused on the relationship between the value of the firm and the 
amount of equity owned by the CEO and/or management. The relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance/value is generally found to be non-
                                                 
6
 See Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Fama, 1980. 
7
 James Cayne, the former COB/CEO of Bear Stearns provides an excellent example of this conjecture.  Mr. 
Cayne spent 10 of 21 working days away from the office playing golf or bridge in July 2007 – the same 
month that two Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed.  See “Bear CEO's Handling Of Crisis Raises Issues”, 
The Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2007. 
8
 An alternative possibility is that low frequency golfers spend time on different hobbies such as boating or 
tennis. This possibility biases against finding the relationships documented in this study. 
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monotonic (Morck, Shliefer, Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991). These studies find increasing firm value as managerial ownership 
increases from low levels, which is consistent with incentive alignment. The decrease in 
firm value at higher levels of managerial ownership is attributed managerial 
entrenchment, where managers with high ownership can engage in projects that provide 
private benefits without discipline from shareholders or financial markets. In a recent 
study, Tumarkin (2010) attempts to address the endogeneity between CEO incentives and 
firm value using econometric instruments, which enables him to analyze the exogenous 
change in firm value from CEO incentives.  He documents that firms with the mean level 
of CEO incentives have Tobin’s Q that is 10% higher than counterfactual firms without 
CEO incentives. Although these studies are generally consistent with the arguments of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), they are not fully satisfying because they jointly test the 
importance of incentives on CEO effort and the importance of CEO effort on 
performance. This limitation is driven by the difficulty in measuring CEO effort. This 
study provides a more complete analysis as CEO leisure consumption provides direct 
insight into CEO effort, which allows us to test the hypotheses separately. Based on the 
predictions of agency theory, we expect higher CEO ownership and stronger equity-based 
incentives to be negatively correlated with leisure consumption, as CEOs work harder 
when they have stronger financial incentives. 
 Although CEO effort is regarded as an important determinant of firm performance, 
there is relatively little empirical support for this assumption.  Two studies link CEO 
distractions to declines in performance, which is consistent with the importance of CEO 
effort in firm performance. Bennedsen et al. (2007) analyzes firm performance following 
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the death of a relative for a sample of small, Danish firms and documents performance 
declines following the relative’s death. Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that award 
winning CEOs are more likely to write books and serve on multiple boards, two activities 
that may distract the CEO from her duties at the firm.  They also find that performance 
declines at firms following CEO awards, but they do not directly link the new 
extracurricular activities to underperformance. We expect that CEOs devoting the most 
time to leisure will have weaker firm performance as they allocate less effort and time 
seeking and evaluating investment opportunities. 
 The amount of effort required of the CEO to maximize performance is likely to 
vary significantly by firm because of differences in the competitive environment and 
corporate structure. Smith and Watts (1992) document stronger incentives for CEOs 
when firms have more valuable growth options, which is consistent with the notion that 
strong incentives are needed when CEO effort is more valuable. CEO effort is important 
in firms with valuable growth options because there are a greater number of new 
investments to evaluate and these projects have a larger impact on firm performance. This 
indicates that deviations from optimal CEO effort will have a larger impact on firm 
performance in industries where CEO effort is most valuable. We expect that high levels 
of leisure consumption will have the greatest impact on firm performance when the firm 
operates in an industry with high growth. 
 Harris & Holmstrom (1982) outline a model where information asymmetries 
between principals and agents are reduced as the principals observe the agent over a 
number of periods. Zajac (1990) applied this model to the relationship between directors 
and CEOs and argues that the superior performance of inside-hire CEOs is consistent 
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with reduced information asymmetries when the new CEO is promoted internally. Zhang 
(2008) provides further support for this argument, as newly hired CEOs are more likely 
to be terminated if they were external candidates. The preferences revealed by the CEO 
early in her tenure are likely to influence the optimal level of incentives needed to 
maximize shareholder value. Existing empirical evidence suggests that directors use 
equity grants to adjust incentives when they deviate from ideal levels (Core and Guay, 
1999). We expect that directors will make larger adjustments to CEO incentives early in 
the CEO’s tenure, as information asymmetries are resolved. This indicates that directors 
will provide compensation with stronger incentives when CEOs reveal preferences for 
high levels of leisure and that the adjustment to incentives will be the greatest for CEOs 
with short tenures.  
 
III. Data and Empirical Methods 
3.1. Sample Construction 
 
 The first focus of this study is to analyze the relationship between the time CEOs 
spend on the golf course and the strength of governance as measured by ownership and 
total incentives. We also analyze the relationship between high levels of leisure 
consumption and firm performance. Finally, we look at CEO pay for performance 
sensitivity to determine if CEO effort is reflected in structure of compensation selected 
by the board. These analyses require data collection from a multitude of sources 
including Compustat (accounting variables), CRSP (firm size, stock returns, and return 
volatility), Execucomp (compensation and incentives), RiskMetrics (firm governance), 
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Thompson (institutional ownership), and the United States Golf Assocation (golfing 
records).  
 We use the USGA’s database of golf handicaps to determine the frequency of golf 
for a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs. This system, the Golf Handicap and Information 
Network (GHIN), is designed as a tool to calculate and maintain golfers’ handicaps and 
to provide a method to verify a playing partner’s handicap. We identify each CEO in the 
USGA records by matching based on name, proximity of the club to firm headquarters, 
and the exclusivity of the club (i.e. private and expensive).9 The round-by-round history 
contains all of the rounds entered into the system and includes the month and year of the 
round, the golfer’s score, the course rating and slope, and whether the round was played 
at the golfer’s home course. The GHIN system is widely populated starting in 2008, but 
the length of each player’s history is driven by the date her regional association became 
affiliated with the USGA.  We include firm years where the CEO’s first round in the 
system is prior to the beginning of the second quarter of the fiscal year.10 We identify 363 
CEOs with records in the GHIN system over the period of 2008 to 2012, which 
corresponds to 1,233 unique CEO-year observations. This represents almost 16% of the 
universe of S&P 1500 observations over the sample period, which consists of 7,519 
CEO-years for 2,282 unique CEOs. 
3.2. Golf Frequency as Leisure Consumption 
 
 The frequency of golf is a reasonable measure of leisure consumption as many 
CEOs play a substantial amount of golf, the direct time commitment for a single round is 
considerable, and numerous rounds are played at vacation destinations. The distribution 
                                                 
9
 For club proximity, we look for clubs within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. 
10
 This truncation eliminates observations where the full year of golf records is not observed. 
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of golf frequency is displayed in Figure 1 – the long tail of the distribution highlights that 
CEOs frequently spend a large amount of time playing golf. The time it takes to play a 
single round is significant as most rounds extend beyond 4 hours, not including any time 
spent driving to the club, shopping in the pro-shop, changing clothes, warming up, or 
socializing after the round. It is not unusual for golfers to spend the majority of the day at 
a golf club to play a single round. Finally, it is common for CEOs to play golf while 
staying at their vacation properties. Yermack (2006) documents that the presence of an 
out of state club membership significantly increases the likelihood that a CEO reports 
using company aircraft for personal travel. In our sample, over 40% of the CEOs are 
members at multiple clubs and many of the clubs coincide with vacation destinations.11 
Beyond the direct time commitment, high levels of golf may reveal a strong preference 
for leisure, such that golf consumption may only represent the tip of the iceberg. 
 Clearly, some of the rounds played by CEOs have a valid business purpose, which 
leads to a natural critique of using golf to measure leisure consumption. The notion that 
“business gets done on the golf course” is commonly held and suggests that the observed 
patterns of golf reflect an attempt to generate or solidify business relationships by the 
CEO.12 Although a valid concern, the high level of golf observed for some executives is 
consistent with a strong leisure component – the CEOs in the top decile played a 
minimum of 37 rounds per fiscal year, which is difficult to reconcile with value 
maximizing behavior. In fact, a back-of-the-envelope estimate for the minimum number 
                                                 
11
 Approximately 50% of the CEOs with multiple memberships are members at clubs that belong to 
different golf associations, with each association representing the clubs in a specific geographic area 
(commonly a state). 
12
 A secondary criticism of golf as leisure consumption is the increase in productivity from smartphones 
and mobile Internet devices. This criticism is tempered by the fact that many golf courses actually prohibit 
golfers from using these devices on the course and in the clubhouse. A simple Google search of “country 
club” and “cell phone policy” reveals more than 3,000 hits and a cursory review indicates these policies are 
intended to curtail phone usage on the course. 
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of hours that a CEO in the top decile allocates to golf is more than 220 hours – roughly 
equivalent to 5.5 weeks of work.13 We document further evidence supporting the leisure 
focus of golf by studying the change in golf following CEOs’ retirements. In a sample of 
80 CEOs that exit their firm during the sample period, we find that the average number of 
rounds increases from 14 during the last year of employment to 20 in the year following 
the retirement.  This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level and represents 
an increase of 42%, which is consistent with CEOs allocating more time to leisure when 
they are no longer employed fulltime. To the extent that some rounds in our sample could 
be deemed as having a valid business propose, it would bias against finding proposed 
results.14 Additionally, we attempt to control for the importance of golf in business by 
including the number of acquisitions and prior sales growth, as well as industry and year 
indicator variables in multivariate analyses.15  
3.3. Variable Construction and Summary Statistics 
 
 The primary variables used to measure CEO incentives in this study are CEO 
Percent Ownership and CEO Wealth-Performance Sensitivity (CEO WPS).  Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) argue that percent ownership is the most appropriate variable to measure 
a CEO’s incentives from stock ownership; we collect CEO Percent Ownership from 
Execucomp for each CEO. CEOs also hold significant numbers of options, which provide 
financial incentives for increasing shareholder wealth.  To measure the combined 
                                                 
13
 We use an estimate of 6 hours per round to account for the time spent playing and practicing 
14
 In this study, we assume that golf frequency is inversely related to the effort provided the firm.  If the 
majority of rounds had a valid business purpose, then golf frequency would be positively correlated with 
effort.  We are unaware of any theory that would predict that effort is a decreasing function of incentives 
and monitoring, that effort destroys value, and that compensation would adjust downward as effort 
increases. 
15
 We use the number of acquisitions and prior sales growth to control for settings where CEO networking 
and negotiating are expected to most valuable. 
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incentive strength of stock and options we use CEO WPS, which is defined as the change 
in dollar value of the executive’s firm-specific wealth associated with a one thousand 
dollar change in firm value and is calculated as: 
     
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   $1,000         (1) 
For each outstanding option, we calculate an individual delta based on time to expiration, 
strike price, the fiscal year-end stock price, 3-year average dividend yield and standard 
deviation of monthly returns over the prior 60 months. We then calculate the total delta of 
the option portfolio as the summation of the product of each individual delta and the 
number of underlying shares.  The measure of WPS used in this study is analogous with 
the pay for performance from direct stock holdings and options as calculated in Jensen 
and Murphy (1990). 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for observable firm and CEO characteristics 
for the sample of firm years linked to golfing records (“the golfer sample”) and the 
overall sample of S&P 1500 firm years over the period of 2008 to 2012. The golfer 
sample consists of large, profitable firms with highly compensated CEOs. The mean 
values of sales, enterprise value, MVE, and ROA are larger for the golfing sample, but 
the importance of these differences is tempered by the fact that 50% of observations in 
the golfer sample are for S&P 500 firm.16 For example, the average firm in the S&P 1500 
universe has a MVE of $7.2 billion versus $12.6 billion in the golfer sample. When you 
restrict the samples to firms in the S&P 500, the overall average MVE is $22.0 billion 
and the average for the golfer sample is $23.5 billion.  
                                                 
16
 In untabulated results, we compare the sample of firm characteristics of golfing CEOs from S&P 500 
firms to the universe of S&P 500 firms don’t find significant differences with the exception of MTB, which 
is slightly lower for the golfing sample and significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the differences between 
the non-S&P 500 golfing sample and the universe of non-S&P 500 firms are insignificant with the 
exception of MTB, which is slightly lower for the golfing sample and significant at the 10% level. 
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 The leisure activities of CEOs are likely to vary based on personal preferences 
and we have identified a group with a revealed preference for golf. Because of the 
inability to observe the leisure consumption of CEOs without records in the GHIN 
system, we focus my analyses on the sample of CEO-years that are matched to golfing 
records. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the sample of firm years linked to golfing 
records and the S&P 1500 universe by Fama-French 12 industry and shows that financial 
services and manufacturing appear to be overweight in the golfing sample and business 
equipment is underweight. To account for these systematic differences in the distribution 
of industries, we include indicator variables for Fama-French 48 industries in all 
multivariate regressions. 
 There is significant variation in the time spent playing golf by CEOs, which is 
highlighted in Table 2, but it is clear that that many CEOs devote a substantial amount of 
time to playing golf. The golf industry defines a core golfer as an individual that plays 8 
to 24 regulation rounds per year and an avid golfer as an individual that plays 25 or more 
regulation rounds per year – based on these definitions approximately 58 percent of the 
CEOs in my sample would be considered a core or avid golfer. In the top quartile of 
CEO-year observations, the minimum number of rounds is 22, which represents a time 
commitment of 88 to 132 hours annually – this is 2 to 3 weeks of work based on a 40-
hour workweek. 17  Additionally, the amount of time spent practicing is likely to be 
correlated with the frequency of play, such that the time allocated by the most frequent 
golfers is significantly higher than suggested by their play alone. This is evident as the 
                                                 
17
 This represents a lower bound of the time commitment. It is common for golfers to omit rounds from the 
GHIN system when they only play 9 holes, practice rounds, and rounds where the format does not follow 
regulation play (i.e. best ball, scramble, match-play). Additionally, many individuals spend time hitting 
range balls and practicing chipping/putting on days where they don’t play any golf. 
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average handicap drops from 16.6 in the first quartile to 12.4 in the fourth quartile – a 
change from the 31% percentile to the 52% percentile.18 
 Figure 3 provides another interesting perspective into the leisure/labor choice 
during periods of economic uncertainty, as the average number of rounds played is 
significantly lower in 2008 than over the remainder of the sample period. There is also a 
slight dip in 2011, a year in which stock returns were largely flat and much lower than the 
returns in 2009, 2010, or 2012. 
 We begin our analysis by looking at univariate comparisons of firm 
characteristics across CEO-years with above/below median golf in Table 3. The median 
frequency of golf for all CEO-years is 10 rounds, thus we divide the golfer sample into 
those observations with 0 to 10 rounds and those with 11 or more rounds. Overall, there 
are very few statistical differences in firm characteristics between the samples of above- 
and below-median frequency golfers as the mean values of Sales, Enterprise Value, MTB, 
MVE, Tobin’s Q, Leverage, ROA, Institutional Ownership, E-Index, and Blockholder do 
not have differences that are statistically significant. The most striking pattern is the 
difference in compensation measures between the two samples as mean values for Bonus, 
Total Current Compensation, Total Compensation are economically and statistically 
lower for the sample with above median frequency. The average total compensation is 
$1.31 million higher for the below median sample, an increase of nearly 20%. 
Additionally, the financial incentives of the CEOs in the above median sample appear 
lower than the sample of less frequent golfers as the Wealth Performance Sensitivity is 
$8.47 lower (p-value 0.058) and the CEO Ownership is .861% lower (p-value = 0.048).  
                                                 
18
 This is based on the overall distribution of handicaps retrieved from the USGA.  See 
http://www.usga.org/handicapping/articles_resources/Men-s--Handicap-Indexes/ 
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 Overall, this pattern highlights an important relationship between incentives, 
compensation, and leisure consumption across firms that appear otherwise similar. CEOs 
with stronger financial incentives play less golf than CEOs with weaker financial 
incentives, which is consistent with financial incentives aligning the interests of CEOs 
with shareholders. The negative relationship between the frequency of golf and 
compensation is consistent with the conjecture that compensation should be correlated 
with the effort required of the job. This analysis does not distinguish between a CEO that 
recorded 11 rounds and one that recorded 30, but there may be important variation in firm 
and governance characteristics across these observations. To provide a more thorough 
analysis of the relationship between CEO effort and corporate governance, we utilize a 
linear regression framework in the next section. 
 
IV. Results 
4.1. Determinants of CEO Leisure Consumption 
 
 To analyze the importance in governance mechanisms in the labor/leisure 
decision of CEOs, we perform a series of linear regressions using the natural log of the 
number of rounds played annually as the dependent variable. Table 4 contains coefficient 
estimates from multivariate regression analyses of CEO golf frequency on measures of 
incentives and monitoring along with observable firm and CEO characteristics. Across all 
specifications, we include CEO- and firm-level variables to control for differences in 
preferences and job complexity that might influence the consumption of leisure. We draw 
from the executive compensation literature to determine the appropriate control variables, 
as executive compensation should reflect the effort provided by the CEO. Following Core, 
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Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), we include the natural log of beginning of period 
enterprise value and the natural log of the ratio of market-value to book-value to control 
for differences related to size and growth opportunities, as effort may be more valuable 
for a firm with a large base of assets or where new investments are more important.19 We 
control for past stock returns and accounting profitability to account for prior 
performance in the labor/leisure decision. To control for firms where golf may be 
important for business negotiations, we include sales growth and the number of 
acquisitions. We include firm age to account for the stage of the business cycle of the 
firm and CEO tenure to control for horizon concerns that may impact the leisure 
consumption of CEOs (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). We include year and Fama-French 
48 industry indicator variables to control for unobserved differences across the sample 
period and across firms in different industries. 
 Overall, very few control variables are significant determinants of CEO leisure 
consumption, which is consistent with the similar firm characteristics shown between 
observations with high and low golf as shown in Table 3.20  In the first two specifications 
of Table 4, Panel B we analyze the relationship between CEO incentives and leisure 
consumption using the percent of equity owned by the CEO and the sensitivity of the 
CEO’s firm-specific wealth to changes in firm value. In all regressions we use lagged 
values of right hand side variables to help establish causality. In the first specification, the 
variable of interest is Wealth-Performance Sensitivity. This variable captures the dollar 
change in the CEO’s firm specific wealth from a $1,000 change in firm value. The 
                                                 
19
 We use enterprise value following Gabaix and Landier (2008), who conclude that the enterprise value is 
a high quality measure of firm size. All results are consistent when we measure firm size using MVE. 
20
 To facilitate presentation of results, we suppress control variables with insignificant coefficient estimates. 
These variables include Returnst-1, Leverage, Return Volatilityt-1, Sales Growth, and Number of 
Acquisitions.  
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coefficient on Wealth-Performance Sensitivity is -0.00240 and is significant at the 1% 
level. We document similar results in the second specification when using CEO 
Ownership, which is equal to the CEOs equity ownership percentage excluding options. 
The coefficient on CEO Ownership is -0.0291 and is significant at the 1 percent level, 
which indicates that CEOs with a larger equity stake allocate less time to leisure 
consumption. The third and fourth specifications demonstrate that the relation between 
CEO incentives and leisure consumption is robust to the inclusion of variables that 
control for differences in monitoring. This pattern is consistent with arguments of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), where CEOs allocate more effort to managing firm assets when 
they bear a higher cost of shirking. Although highly consistent with theory, this is the 
first evidence that day-to-day CEO leisure consumption is influenced by 
ownership/incentives. 
   
4.2. Leisure Consumption and Firm Performance 
4.2.a. The Level of Firm Performance 
 
 Analogous to the lack of evidence linking CEO effort to incentives and 
monitoring, the current literature provides very little evidence that CEO effort is 
correlated with firm performance. Shirking by the CEO is a large presumed cost of the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and distracted CEOs have been associated 
with low performance in a handful of studies (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2009). To analyze the relationship between CEO leisure and firm performance, we 
categorized firm-years into quartiles based on the frequency of golf by the CEO. The 
primary variables of interest are Number of Rounds, which is a continuous variable equal 
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to the observed number of rounds during the fiscal year and Frequent Golfer (Q4), which 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO played 22 or more rounds during the year.  
 Although we have documented strong evidence that CEO effort is influenced by 
equity-based incentives, it remains an open question if high levels of observed leisure are 
associated with poor performance. Recent research has documented that CEO turnover is 
tied to the performance of the firm, which could provide a powerful incentive for CEOs 
to curtail their leisure if it negatively impacts firm performance (Jenter and Lewellen, 
2010). Table 5, Panel A provides insight into correlation between firm performance and 
CEO leisure consumption, where performance is measured by ROA and industry adjusted 
ROA. Using both measures, firm performance is lower on average for firm-years where 
the CEOs allocated the most time to leisure, as the average values for Quartile 4 are 
smaller than Quartiles 1 to 3. The underperformance is economically significant as the 
mean ROA for the firms in Quartile 4 is 110 basis points lower than other firms in the 
sample (p-value = 0.033). This provides preliminary evidence that shirking by the CEO is 
associated with weaker performance, but this setting does not control for firm 
characteristics that might influence firm performance. To provide a more robust analysis 
of the relationship between leisure and firm performance, we utilize multivariate linear 
regressions that control for firm and executive characteristics that impact the performance 
of the firm. In all specifications we include Enterprise Value and MTB to account for 
varying profitability that is driven by size and growth opportunities and we include 
Return Volatility to measure the relative risk of the firm. We include Board Independence 
and Institutional Ownership to account for performance differences that are driven by the 
strength of monitoring. We control for past profitability using lagged values of the 
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dependent variable and capture the different levels of incentives using CEO Ownership. 
Additionally, we control for time- and industry-specific unobservable characteristics 
using year and Fama-French 48 industry indicator variables. 
 Panel B of Table 5 contains the coefficient estimates from the multivariate 
analyses of firm performance. We find higher returns for firms with greater growth 
options and lower returns for firms with higher stock return volatility; also, we find that 
past performance is closely tied to future performance. We document lower ROA for 
firms with higher leverage as interest expense reduces the earnings available to 
shareholders. We do not find any significant differences in performance from CEO equity 
based incentives or institutional ownership monitoring. 
 In the first 3 specifications, we use an ordinary least squares framework to 
estimate the relation between CEO golf frequency and firm performance. In the first 
specification, we measure golf frequency using Number of Rounds, which has a negative 
and significant coefficient estimate. In the second specification, we include indicator 
variables for each quartile of golf frequency (Quartile 1 – Quartile 4), which shows that 
the most frequent golfers have the lowest performance. This pattern is reinforced in the 
third specification, where we include an indicator for Quartile 4, which corresponds to 
those firm years where the CEO recorded 22 or more rounds in the GHIN system. The 
coefficient Quartile 4 is -0.0110 and significant at the 1% level, which is economically 
significant as well since the sample mean ROA is 5.3%. These results confirm that 
shirking by the CEO is strongly correlated with weaker firm performance and emphasizes 
the importance of strong monitoring and incentives to ensure that CEOs provide 
sufficient effort to maximize shareholder value.  
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 In the forth and fifth specifications, we employ a two-stage least squares 
framework to help address concerns of endogeneity. In order to implement this analysis 
we require an instrumental variable that is correlated with the amount of golf CEOs 
choose to play, but is uncorrelated with firm profitability (ROA). We believe a valid 
instrument in this particular setting is the number of clear days in the state in which the 
company’s headquarters are located, which we collect from the National Oceanic 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Columns 4 and 5 from panel B of Table 5 present 
the coefficient estimates from second stage regressions, where the dependent variable is 
ROA. Consistent with our primary results, the coefficient estimates on the fitted values 
for the Number of Rounds and Quartile 4 are negative and significant. 
4.2.b. Firm Performance when CEO Effort is Most Important 
 
 A potential concern regarding the relationship between firm performance and 
CEO leisure consumption is the direction of causality. A potential interpretation of the 
negative relationship between high levels of leisure consumption and firm performance is 
that CEOs choose to allocate a significant amount of time to leisure when they expect 
firm performance to be poor, possibly because there are few projects to evaluate. 
 To address this concern, we look at the relationship between firm performance 
and CEO leisure consumption in firms where CEO effort is expected to be most valuable. 
If CEO effort is driving firm performance, then high levels of leisure should have the 
greatest effect on firms where effort is expected to be most valuable. Conversely, if CEOs 
are simply reacting to poor expected performance, then the relationship between 
operating performance and leisure consumption should be relatively constant across 
different types of firms. The existing literature documents stronger incentives for CEOs 
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in high growth (Smith and Watts, 1992), which suggests that CEO effort is most valuable 
in rapidly expanding industries. 
 We analyze the differential effect of leisure consumption on firm performance for 
firms based on industry growth. Firms in high growth industries are expected to have a 
greater number of investment opportunities that merit evaluation and thus have a higher 
demand for CEO effort. Firms in low growth industries are expected to focus on the 
efficiency of existing operations, which requires less effort from the CEO. 
 We conduct this analysis by analyzing the relationship between CEO leisure 
consumption and firm performance in high and low growth industries in Table 6. We first 
construct an indicator variable, High Growth Industry, which is equal to 1 if the firm is in 
an industry where the industry median sales growth is above the overall median sales 
growth. In the first specification we separately analyze the relationship between golf 
frequency and firm performance using the Number Rounds – High Growth and Number 
Rounds – Low Growth. The coefficient on Number Rounds – High Growth is negative 
and significant, while the coefficient on Number Rounds – Low Growth is very close to 
zero. This indicates that the negative relation between CEO golf frequency and firm 
performance is concentrated in firms in high growth industries.  
 In the second specification, we construct indicator variables based on the 
frequency of golf and the growth of the industry. Frequent Golfer (Q4) – High Growth, is 
equal to 1 if the CEO played 22 or more rounds during the year and the firm is in a high 
growth industry. Frequent Golfer (Q4) – Low Growth, is equal to 1 if the CEO played 22 
or more rounds during the year and the firm is in a low growth industry. The coefficient 
on Frequent Golfer (Q4) – High Growth is negative and significant, while the coefficient 
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estimate for Frequent Golfer (Q4) – Low Growth is negative and insignificant. The third 
and fourth columns demonstrate that the results robust when instrumenting for the 
frequency of golf using the number of clear days. 
4.2.c. Endogeneity 
 
 It is certainly possible that the relationship between CEO leisure and firm 
performance is endogenous.  If unobservable/omitted variables drive both golf play and 
firm performance, such a relationship would certainly cloud inference in our study. In 
order to address this potential endogeneity bias we analyze the relation between CEO 
leisure and firm performance in a first-difference framework. This alleviates concerns 
that unobserved CEO quality might be driving the relationships that we document. 
CEOs with low inherent quality may be associated with weak performance, and 
these low quality CEOs may choose to consume large amounts of leisure because the 
marginal productivity of their effort is low. Quality is unobservable, which indicates that 
the estimated relationship between leisure consumption and performance may suffer from 
an omitted variable bias. We use a first-difference framework to address this potential 
bias and report our results in Table 7. In this framework, the dependent variable and 
independent variables are measured as differences across firm year observations. Across 
both specifications, the dependent variable is Change in ROA, which is constructed as 
ROAt – ROAt-1. In the first specification of Table 7 the variable of interest is Change in 
Rounds Played, which is equal to Number of Rounds Playedt – Number of Rounds 
Playedt-1. In the second specification, the variable of interest is Change in Frequent 
Golfer (Q4) and is equal to Frequent Golfer (Q4)t - Frequent Golfer (Q4)t-1. This allows 
Change in Frequent Golfer (Q4) to take the value of -1, 0, and 1.  
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 We document that firm performance declines after the enterprise value of the firm 
grows and changes in the market-to-book ratio lead changes in firm performance. 
Additionally, firms appear to experience performance declines following increases in 
return volatility. In both specifications, the coefficient on the variable of interest is 
negative and significant, which indicates that firm performance declines significantly 
when the CEO begins allocating a large amount of time to golf and that firm performance 
improves significantly when the CEO stops allocating a large amount of time to golf. 
Overall, these results indicate that CEO effort is important for firm performance and the 
relationship is not driven by low quality CEOs allocating large amounts of time to leisure 
consumption. 
4.3. Firm Value and CEO Golf Frequency 
 
 We study the relation between CEO leisure consumption and firm value to 
establish the impact of CEO effort on a firm’s stakeholders. We measure firm value using 
Tobin’s Q, which represents the ratio of the market value a firm’s assets to their 
replacement value.  Table 8 presents coefficient estimates from regressions of Tobin’s Q 
on CEO golf frequency and control variables that account for past performance, size, and 
leverage. In the first column, golf frequency is measured by Number of Rounds and the 
coefficient estimate is negative and significant. In the second and third columns, indicator 
variables are used and they provide additional evidence of lower firm value when the 
CEO allocates a large amount of time to leisure consumption. We demonstrate that these 
results hold in a 2 stage-least squares framework in the fourth and fifth columns. Overall, 
these results are consistent with the argument that high levels of CEO leisure 
consumption impacts firm performance and ultimately firm value.  
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4.4. Evidence of Monitoring by Directors 
 
 Monitoring the performance of the CEO is one of the primary responsibilities of 
firms’ directors along with implementing a compensation structure that aligns the 
incentives of the CEO with shareholders. Additionally, directors are responsible for 
terminating and replacing CEOs that are not performing sufficiently. Core and Guay 
(1999) provide evidence that directors use equity grants in response to deviations from 
the optimal level CEO incentives; additionally the authors document that CEO incentives 
increase over her tenure. High levels of leisure consumption by the CEO potentially 
indicate that the existing level of incentives are too weak and need to be adjusted via 
equity based compensation grants. Adjustments to CEO incentives are most likely to be 
necessary early in her tenure, because her existing level of incentives are likely to be low 
and the directors of the firm learn more about her preferences and abilities. 
 To measure the strength of incentives from CEO compensation, we use pay-for-
performance sensitivity (PPS) which measures the change in the value of the CEO’s 
equity based compensation for the $1,000 change in firm value. Table 10 provides 
coefficient estimates from linear regressions of PPS on prior leisure consumption and an 
array of control variables. Consistent with prior literature, we document lower PPS at 
larger firms and increased PPS at firms with greater risk. We also find that PPS is 
significantly lower for new CEOs, which is consistent with Core and Guay (1999). We 
control for the tenure of the CEO using indicator variables that are constructed using the 
quartile breakpoints of the sample distribution of tenure.   
 We measure the prior leisure consumption of the CEO using Ln(Number of 
Roundst-1), which captures the frequency of golf during the prior fiscal year. In the first 
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specification, the coefficient on Ln(Number of Roundst-1) is 0.0208 (p-value = 0.677). 
This indicates that overall, directors do not adjust incentives based on the consumption of 
leisure by CEOs. This is surprising, but it could reflect that existing incentives are 
optimal for many CEOs. Information asymmetry between the CEO and directors 
regarding talent and preferences is likely to be greatest early in the CEOs tenure, such 
that directors may make large adjustments to CEO incentives when leisure preferences 
are originally revealed. 
 To test this possibility, we interact the frequency of golf with the tenure quartile 
indicators, which allows the relationship between prior leisure and incentives to change 
over a CEO’s career. The specifications with these interactions are found in column 2 of 
Table 10. The coefficient estimate on Ln(Number of Roundst-1) * Tenure_Q1, is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient estimates on the other interactions 
are insignificant. This indicates that directors provide strong incentive adjustments to 
CEOs early in their tenure after they reveal a strong preference for leisure consumption. 
Overall, this pattern is consistent the reduction of information asymmetries between 
CEOs and directors over time and directors adjusting incentives for CEOs based on 
revealed preferences. 
 We also look for evidence of directors monitoring by looking at CEO turnover 
events. If CEOs that play a large amount of golf are shirking from their firm-related 
responsibilities, then it may be in shareholders interest to replace the existing CEO. In the 
third and forth columns of Table 10, we analyze this possibility. The dependent variable 
is CEO Turnover, which is equal to one of a different CEO is observed at the firm in the 
next fiscal year. In the third column, the coefficient estimate on Ln(Number of Roundst-1) 
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is 0.216 (p-value = 0.0517), which shows that boards to tend to replace CEOs that 
allocate a large amount of time to golf. In the fourth specification, we examine how this 
relationship changes over a CEOs career and find that the relation between past CEO 
leisure consumption and CEO turnover is concentrated in CEOs with short tenures. This 
is consistent with the notion that directors resolve information asymmetries early in 
CEOs careers and new CEOs have little power over directors. 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Financial models generally assume that CEO effort is important for firm 
performance and costly for the CEO to provide, but difficulty in measuring effort has 
limited financial economists’ ability to test these theories. We measure CEO leisure using 
the frequency of golf during the fiscal year, which provides a proxy for the level of effort 
provided by the CEO. This measure allows us to test the power of incentives and 
monitoring in CEOs labor/leisure decision, the importance of CEO effort in firm 
performance, and the existence of ex-post settling between the CEO and shareholders. 
 We document that CEO leisure consumption is lower for firms where the CEO 
has stronger incentives. This confirms the importance of these governance mechanisms in 
preventing shirking as predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Specifically, we find 
that higher CEO ownership is associated with lower leisure consumption. The 
relationship between CEO leisure consumption and corporate governance is incomplete 
without analyzing the performance of the firm. It’s possible that existing incentives and 
governance are optimal for all firms, such that observed levels of leisure consumption are 
consistent with maximizing shareholder value. Alternatively, high levels of leisure 
consumption could reflect shirking by the CEO as a result from sub-optimal governance, 
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which would result in underperformance. In this study, we find evidence of the latter as 
we also document that high levels of leisure by the CEO are associated with lower firm 
performance. We find that ROA is 1.10% lower in firm-years where the CEO played 22 
or more rounds during the year, which is highly economically significant, as mean ROA 
is 5.30% over the sample period. The relationship between leisure and performance is 
most pronounced in high growth and non-regulated industries, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis that CEO effort is more important in these industries. This provides 
evidence that shirking by the CEO can represent a problem for shareholders. 
 Ideally compensation should reflect the effort of the CEO in generating returns for 
shareholders, but there is existing evidence that CEO compensation reflects rent seeking 
by powerful CEOs. We analyze the composition of CEO compensation as a function of 
prior leisure consumption and observable firm and CEO characteristics. We find that PPS 
is higher for CEOs who allocate more time to leisure consumption, but this relationship is 
muted as the tenure of the CEO increases.  
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Appendix 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the fiscal years 2008 to 2012 for the intersection of firms covered by Execucomp, CRSP, and Compustat along with the 
sample of observations where the CEOs golfing records were identified in the USGA’s GHIN database. Sales, Enterprise Value, Tobin’s Q, Leverage, ROA, and 
Firm Age were collected from Compustat; MVE was collected from CRSP; Institutional Ownership and Blockholder were collected from Thompson Financial; 
CEO/Chairman were collected from Riskmetrics. Salary, Bonus, Salary+Bonus, Total Compensation, WPS, CEO Ownership, and Age were collected from 
Execucomp. 
 
  S&P 1500 Firms   Golfing Sample 
N Mean Median P10 P90 N Mean Median P10 P90 
Sales 7,519 6,448 1,412 226.992 12,988 1,233 11,376 2,812 348.524 23,754 
Enterprise Value 7,519 20,868 3,521 492.9142 34,452 1,233 35,111 8,245 873.6846 71,042 
MVE 7,519 7,228 1,610 267.6574 15,220 1,233 12,578 3,641 367.7115 26,539 
Tobin's Q 7,518 1.64 1.31 0.93 2.73 1,233 1.60 1.31 0.95 2.60 
Leverage 7,519 22.10% 18.92% 0.00% 48.62% 1,233 23.54% 20.66% 0.13% 48.52% 
ROA 7,519 4.36% 4.29% -3.87% 14.33% 1,233 5.15% 4.54% -1.00% 14.19% 
Institutional Ownership 7,519 68.22% 78.24% 0.00% 100.00% 1,233 68.90% 78.03% 0.00% 99.18% 
Blockholder (1/0) 7,519 0.80 1 0 1 1,233 0.786 1 0 1 
Firm Age 7,519 27.61 22 11 58 1,233 30.66 24 12 59 
Salary 7,519 814 760 412.5 1,217 1,233 963 915 516.923 1,417 
Bonus 7,519 232 0 0 450 1,233 462 0 0 682.5 
Salary + Bonus 7,519 1,046 830.77 438.66 1,530 1,233 1,425 954.8 545.069 2,000 
Total Compensation 7,519 5,348 3,621 960.892 11,392 1,233 7,491 5,364 1409.006 14,851 
CEO/Chairman (1/0) 6,541 0.54 1 0 1 1,140 0.62 1 0 1 
WPS 7,518 27.81 9.53 1.29 65.20 1,233 21.54 7.94 1.30 49.23 
CEO Ownership 7,519 1.99 0.351 0 4.52 1,233 1.43 0.299 0 3.118 
Age 7,513 56.00 56 47 65 1,233 56.51 56 49 64 
Tenure 7,519 9.27 7 3 18   1,233 9.92 8 3 19 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics – CEO Golf Characteristics 
 
Table 2, Panel A provides summary statistics for the overall sample of firm years for the 363 CEOs that 
were identified in the USGA’s GHIN database for the period of 2008 to 2012; all statistics are calculated 
based on the firm’s fiscal year. Number of Rounds is equal to the number of days where the CEO recorded 
a round of golf during the firm’s fiscal year. Observations are limited to those where the CEO’s first round 
in the GHIN system occurs prior to the start of the fiscal year or in the first 90 days of the fiscal year. Panel 
B reports the observations for each quartile of frequency; Quartile 1 is limited to observations with 0 to 2 
rounds; Quartile 2 is limited to observations with 3 to 10 rounds; Quartile 3 is limited to observations with 
11 to 21 rounds; Quartile 4 limited to observations with 22 or more rounds. 
 
Panel A – Full Sample 
N Mean S.D. Median P25 P75 Max 
Number of Rounds 1,233 15.74 18.60 10 2 23 146 
Number of Rounds - Away 1,233 4.31 8.27 1 0 5 76 
Number of Rounds - Home 1,233 11.43 14.52 6 1 17 88 
Panel B – Sample by Quartile 
N Mean S.D. Median P25 P75 Max 
Quartile = 1 
Number of Rounds 325 0.44 0.75 0 0 1 2 
Number of Rounds - Away 325 0.06 0.25 0 0 0 2 
Number of Rounds - Home 325 0.38 0.69 0 0 1 2 
Average Score 92 93.91 9.52 94 86 100 127 
Quartile = 2 
Number of Rounds 302 6.24 2.35 6 4 8 10 
Number of Rounds - Away 302 1.67 2.35 1 0 3 10 
Number of Rounds - Home 302 4.57 2.60 4 3 6 10 
Average Score 302 93.64 7.04 93 89 97 118 
Quartile = 3 
Number of Rounds 277 15.35 3.03 15 13 18 21 
Number of Rounds - Away 277 4.69 4.75 3 0 7 20 
Number of Rounds - Home 277 10.66 5.35 11 7 15 21 
    Average Score 277 91.29 5.72 91 87 95 110 
Quartile = 4 
Number of Rounds 329 39.92 19.62 34 26 48 146 
Number of Rounds - Away 329 10.62 12.97 6 2 14 76 
Number of Rounds - Home 329 29.30 16.61 25 20 35 88 
Average Score 329 89.12 6.12 89 85 92 110 
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Table 3 – Univariate Comparison by Frequency of CEO Golf 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the sample of firm years from Execucomp for the 363 CEOs that 
were identified in the USGA’s GHIN database for the period of 2008 to 2012 separately for the firm-years 
where the CEO recorded more than 11 rounds (Above Median) and where the CEO recorded 10 or less 
rounds (Below Median). 
 
 
  Comparison of Mean Values 
Above Median Below Median Difference P-Value 
Size & Age 
Sales 12,843 9,958 2,885 (0.193) 
Enterprise Value 31,426 38,671 -7,245 (0.492) 
MVE 13,208 11,970 1,238 (0.650) 
Leverage 0.23 0.24 -0.0109 (0.572) 
SP500 0.52 0.48 0.0398 (0.415) 
Firm Age 31.79 29.59 2.197 (0.186) 
Valuation 
MTB 1.23 1.23 0.00477 (0.959) 
Tobin's Q 1.63 1.57 0.0536 (0.549) 
ROA 0.05 0.05 0.000612 (0.931) 
Governance 
Institutional Ownership 0.69 0.69 -0.00170 (0.954) 
E-Index 3.10 3.10 0.00149 (0.988) 
Blockholder (1/0) 0.79 0.79 0.00409 (0.914) 
CEO/Chairman (1/0) 0.61 0.63 -0.0120 (0.800) 
Compensation 
Salary 945 980 -35.22 (0.412) 
Bonus 174 740 -565.9** (0.0353) 
Salary + Bonus 1,119 1,720 -601.1** (0.0322) 
Total Compensation 6,824 8,135 -1,311* (0.0734) 
CEO Incentives 
WPS 17.24 25.69 -8.447* (0.0583) 
CEO Ownership 0.99 1.85 -0.861** (0.0475) 
Age 56.72 56.29 0.431 (0.453) 
Tenure 9.76 10.09 -0.335 (0.615) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table 4 – Determinants of CEO Golf Frequency 
 
Table 4, presents coefficient estimates from linear regressions of the frequency of golf on measures of CEO 
equity based incentives during the period of 2008 to 2012. Ln (Number of Rounds) is equal to the natural 
log of 1 plus the number of rounds recorded by the CEO during the fiscal year; WPSt-1 is calculated as the 
dollar value change in the CEOs stock and option portfolio for a $1,000 change in firm value; CEO 
Ownershipt-1 is collected from Execucomp and represents the CEO percentage ownership. All 
specifications include year and Fama-French 48 industry indicator variables. 
 
VARIABLES Ln (Number of Rounds) 
          Enterprise Value -0.00844 -0.00370 0.000222 0.00584 
(0.785) (0.903) (0.995) (0.864) 
MTB 0.0387 0.0313 0.0717 0.0662 
(0.623) (0.688) (0.398) (0.430) 
Returnst-1 -0.135 -0.134 -0.128 -0.126 
(0.131) (0.133) (0.200) (0.210) 
ROAt-1 0.596 0.562 0.381 0.341 
(0.303) (0.329) (0.566) (0.606) 
Leverage -0.203 -0.196 -0.234 -0.236 
(0.386) (0.401) (0.364) (0.357) 
Return Volatilityt-1 -0.316 -0.310 -0.142 -0.138 
(0.216) (0.222) (0.646) (0.655) 
Sales Growth -0.0301 -0.0320 -0.0447 -0.0511 
(0.878) (0.870) (0.833) (0.810) 
Number of Acquisitions 0.0379 0.0380 0.0373 0.0374 
(0.303) (0.301) (0.307) (0.306) 
Firm Age 0.0828 0.0870 0.0897 0.0948 
(0.257) (0.233) (0.246) (0.220) 
Tenure 0.0637 0.0702 0.0226 0.0278 
(0.383) (0.332) (0.792) (0.744) 
Institutional Ownership -0.0811 -0.0991 
(0.705) (0.644) 
Blockholder (1/0) 0.0849 0.0968 
(0.581) (0.531) 
Board Independence -0.122 -0.235 
(0.865) (0.743) 
CEO/Chairman (1/0) -0.0255 -0.0239 
(0.802) (0.814) 
WPSt-1 -0.00240*** -0.00216** 
(0.00383) (0.0165) 
CEO Ownershipt-1 -0.0291*** -0.0260*** 
(0.000260) (0.00244) 
Industry and Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,233 1,233 1,140 1,140 
R-squared 0.168 0.170 0.168 0.170 
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Table 5 – Firm Performance & CEO Effort 
 
Table 5, Panel A provides mean levels of firm performance from 2008 to 2012 for the sample of SP1500 
firms where the CEO’s golf records were identified in the USGA’s GHIN database. Average performance 
measures are reported separately based on the frequency of golf by the CEO during the fiscal year; Quartile 
1 is limited to observations with 0 to 2 rounds; Quartile 2 is limited to observations with 3 to 10 rounds; 
Quartile 3 is limited to observations with 10 to 21 rounds; Quartile 4 limited to observations with 22 or 
more rounds. Panel B presents coefficient estimates from multivariate linear regressions of firm 
performance on variables that control for past levels of performance and observable firm and CEO 
characteristics. ROA is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items over beginning of period assets; 
Number of Rounds is equal to the number of rounds recorded by the CEO during the fiscal year; Frequent 
Golfer (Q4) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO recorded 22 or more rounds during the 
fiscal year. In the fourth and fifth specifications of Panel B, a 2 stage-least squares framework is employed, 
where the number of clear days in the firm’s headquarter state is used as an instrumental variable for the 
frequency of golf. All regressions include year and industry indicator variables and p-values are presented 
in parentheses.  
 
Panel A – Average Firm Performance by Golf Frequency 
  ROA FF48 Adj. ROA 
Average Values     
Quartile 1 (0 to 2 rounds) 5.54% 1.17% 
Quartile 2 (3 to 10 rounds) 5.73% 1.14% 
Quartile 3 (11 to 21 rounds) 5.53% 1.07% 
Quartile 4 (22+ rounds) 4.50% 0.00% 
Differences 
Quart. 4 - Quart. 1 -0.0104* -0.0117* 
(.0885) (0.0551) 
Quart. 4 - Quart. 1, 2, 3 -0.0110** -0.0105** 
(0.0337) (0.0351) 
Observations 1,208 1,208 
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Panel B – Multivariate Analysis of Firm Performance 
VARIABLES Return on Assets 
Enterprise Valuet-1 0.00200 0.00194 0.00193 -0.00505 -0.00452 
(0.253) (0.264) (0.268) (0.286) (0.265) 
MTBt-1 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.0398*** 0.0393*** 0.0383*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Return on Assetst-1 0.300*** 0.299*** 0.300*** 0.292*** 0.290*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
(Dividend/Asset)t-1 0.193** 0.185** 0.182** 0.783** 0.435** 
(0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0194) (0.0381) (0.0283) 
Return Volatilityt-1 -0.0283* -0.0283* -0.0281* -0.00917 -0.00587 
(0.0517) (0.0529) (0.0544) (0.729) (0.820) 
Tenure -0.00166 -0.00137 -0.00134 0.00728 0.00805 
(0.545) (0.613) (0.625) (0.245) (0.178) 
SP500 (1/0) 0.00369 0.00425 0.00427 0.0298* 0.0303** 
(0.508) (0.452) (0.449) (0.0576) (0.0426) 
Institutional Ownership -0.00448 -0.00459 -0.00465 0.00632 -0.000180 
(0.555) (0.545) (0.539) (0.553) (0.985) 
Leveraget-1 -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.084*** -0.073*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.00169) (<0.001) 
Board Independence -0.0547** -0.0521* -0.0519* -0.0919* -0.0133 
(0.0417) (0.0508) (0.0511) (0.0843) (0.768) 
CEO Ownership 0.000119 8.94e-05 9.71e-05 -0.00153 -0.00123 
(0.779) (0.832) (0.817) (0.133) (0.116) 
Number of Rounds -0.0002** -0.0045** 
(0.0346) (0.0454) 
Quartile 1 0.0497* 
(0.0620) 
Quartile 2 0.0493* 
(0.0617) 
Quartile 3 0.0478* 
(0.0659) 
Quartile 4 0.0379 -0.011*** -0.153** 
(0.137) (0.00894) (0.0266) 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Instrument Clear Days Clear Days 
Observations 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,159 1,159 
R-squared 0.528 0.680 0.528     
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Table 6 – Firm Performance & CEO Effort by Industry Growth 
 
Table 6 presents coefficient estimates from multivariate linear regressions of firm performance on variables 
that control for past levels of performance and observable firm and CEO characteristics from 2008 to 2012 
for the sample of SP1500 firms where the CEO’s golf records were identified in the USGA’s GHIN 
database. ROA is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items over beginning of period assets. High 
Growth Industry is an indicator that equals 1 if the firm operates in an industry with above median sales 
growth; Number of Rounds – High Growth is equal to the number of rounds recorded by the CEO for firms 
in high growth industries; Number of Rounds – Low Growth is equal to the number of rounds recorded by 
the CEO for firms in low growth industries. Frequent Golfer (Q4) - High Growth is an indicator that equals 
1 if the CEO plays 22 or more rounds of golf during the fiscal year and the firm operates in a high growth 
industry; Frequent Golfer (Q4) - Low Growth is an indicator that equals 1 if the CEO plays 22 or more 
rounds of golf during the fiscal year and the firm does not operate in a high growth industry. In the fourth 
and fifth specifications, a 2 stage-least squares framework is employed, where the number of clear days in 
the firm’s headquarter state is used as an instrumental variable for the frequency of golf. All regressions 
include year and industry indicator variables and p-values are presented in parentheses. 
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VARIABLES Return on Assets 
  
Enterprise Valuet-1 0.00209 0.00196 0.00319* 0.00264 
(0.226) (0.255) (0.0903) (0.154) 
MTBt-1 0.0384*** 0.0384*** 0.0400*** 0.0403*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0) (0) 
Return on Assetst-1 0.309*** 0.308*** 0.306*** 0.305*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (7.77e-06) (5.34e-06) 
(Dividend/Assets)t-1 0.208*** 0.193** 0.147* 0.169** 
(0.00888) (0.0122) (0.0610) (0.0198) 
Return Volatilityt-1 -0.0304** -0.0297** -0.0336** -0.0306* 
(0.0368) (0.0426) (0.0337) (0.0522) 
Tenure -0.00230 -0.00209 -0.00342 -0.00318 
(0.413) (0.452) (0.249) (0.295) 
SP500 (1/0) 0.00288 0.00332 -0.000192 0.000694 
(0.605) (0.555) (0.975) (0.910) 
Institutional Ownership -0.00491 -0.00501 -0.00628 -0.00506 
(0.514) (0.503) (0.430) (0.520) 
Leveraget-1 -0.0496*** -0.0495*** -0.0470*** -0.0491*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.000316) (0.000105) 
Board Independence -0.0488* -0.0480* -0.0484 -0.0552* 
(0.0717) (0.0731) (0.105) (0.0640) 
CEO Ownership 0.000142 0.000116 0.000292 0.000185 
(0.726) (0.772) (0.482) (0.655) 
High Growth Industry 0.0200*** 0.0181*** 0.0348*** 0.0237*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (5.27e-06) (7.34e-05) 
Number Rounds - High Growth -0.000425** -0.000360** 
(0.0104) (0.0425) 
Number Rounds - Low Growth -0.00001 0.000992** 
(0.896) (0.0352) 
Frequent Golfer (Q4) - High Growth -0.0193*** -0.0174*** 
(0.00171) (0.00777) 
Frequent Golfer (Q4) - Low Growth -0.00251 0.0198 
(0.625) (0.326) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Instrument Clear Days Clear Days 
Observations 1,208 1,208 1,159 1,159 
R-squared 0.535 0.536 
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Table 7 – Change in Firm Performance 
 
Table 7 presents coefficient estimates from multivariate linear regressions of changes in firm performance 
on variables that control for past changes in performance and changes in observable firm and CEO 
characteristics. Change in ROA is calculated as ROAt – ROAt-1; Change in Number of Rounds is calculated 
as the change in the number of rounds played by the CEO during year t from year t-1. Change in Freq. 
Golfer (Q4) is equal to Freq. Golfer (Q4) - Freq. Golfer (Q4)t-1. 
 
VARIABLES Change in ROA 
      Constant 0.00368* 0.00370* 
(0.0982) (0.0960) 
Change in Ent. Valuet-1 -0.0236** -0.0240** 
(0.0326) (0.0308) 
Change in MTBt-1 0.0692*** 0.0699*** 
(<.001) (<.001) 
Change in Return Vol.t-1 -0.0570* -0.0567* 
(0.0900) (0.0906) 
Change in ROAt-1 -0.234*** -0.231*** 
(<.001) (<.001) 
Change in Div/Assets 0.0669 0.0517 
(0.336) (0.408) 
Change in Instit. Ownership -0.0376 -0.0376 
(0.206) (0.205) 
Change in Leveraget-1 -0.00454 -0.00627 
(0.889) (0.845) 
Change in Board Independence 0.0230 0.0159 
(0.681) (0.783) 
Change in CEO Ownership -0.000983 -0.000965 
(0.204) (0.217) 
Change in CEO/COB  -0.00378 -0.00443 
(0.566) (0.502) 
Change in Number of Rounds -0.000622** 
(0.0141) 
Change in Freq. Golfer (Q4) -0.0102** 
(0.0426) 
Observations 976 976 
R-squared 0.140 0.135 
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Table 8 – Tobin’s Q 
 
Table 8 presents coefficient estimates from multivariate linear regressions of Tobin’s Q on variables that 
control for past levels of performance and observable firm and CEO characteristics. Number of Rounds is 
equal to the number of rounds recorded by the CEO during the fiscal year; Quartile 1 is equal to 1 for 
observations with 0 to 2 rounds; Quartile 2 is equal to 1 for observations with 3 to 10 rounds; Quartile 4 is 
equal to 1 for observations with 10 to 21 rounds; Quartile 4 is equal to 1 for observations with 22 or more 
rounds. In the fourth and fifth specifications, a 2 stage-least squares framework is employed, where the 
number of clear days in the firm’s headquarter state is used as an instrumental variable for the frequency of 
golf. All regressions include year and industry indicator variables and p-values are presented in parentheses.  
 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q 
Enterprise Valuet-1 0.00253 0.00237 0.00272 -0.111* -0.103** 
(0.878) (0.887) (0.870) (0.0705) (0.0402) 
MTBt-1 0.746*** 0.746*** 0.745*** 0.747*** 0.732*** 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Return on Assetst-1 1.534** 1.542** 1.533** 1.372** 1.346** 
(0.0260) (0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0227) (0.0145) 
(Dividend/Asset)t-1 7.040*** 6.849*** 6.924*** 15.93*** 10.82*** 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.00206) (<.001) 
Return Volatilityt-1 0.617*** 0.634*** 0.618*** 0.974*** 1.023*** 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (0.00477) (0.00179) 
Tenure 0.0211 0.0211 0.0224 0.158* 0.169** 
(0.378) (0.374) (0.348) (0.0627) (0.0354) 
SP500 (1/0) 0.113** 0.116** 0.115** 0.529*** 0.536*** 
(0.0279) (0.0250) (0.0268) (0.00911) (0.00398) 
Institutional Ownership -0.140* -0.145* -0.142* -0.00149 -0.0969 
(0.0711) (0.0630) (0.0676) (0.991) (0.424) 
Leveraget-1 -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.82*** -1.359*** -1.194*** 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
Board Independence 0.280 0.302 0.300 -0.244 0.910 
(0.268) (0.235) (0.240) (0.730) (0.131) 
CEO Ownership -0.0074* -0.00691* -0.0074* -0.0312** -0.0268*** 
(0.0650) (0.0836) (0.0656) (0.0185) (0.00677) 
Number of Rounds -0.00179* -0.0665** 
(0.0596) (0.0265) 
Quartile 1 0.743*** 
(0.00187) 
Quartile 2 0.720*** 
(0.00296) 
Quartile 3 0.800*** 
(0.000743) 
Quartile 4 0.685*** -0.0703* -2.240** 
(0.00338) (0.0820) (0.0103) 
Year and Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Instrument Clear Days Clear Days 
Observations 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,159 1,159 
R-squared 0.656 0.920 0.656     
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Table 9 – Pay Performance Sensitivity & CEO Turnover 
 
Table 9 presents coefficient estimates from multivariate regressions of pay performance sensitivity and 
CEO turnover on prior golf frequency and other observable firm and CEO characteristics. The sample 
consists of SP1500 firms from 2008 to 2012 where the CEOs golf records were identified in the USGA’s 
GHIN database. The dependent variable, Pay Performance Sensitivity, is equal to the dollar value change in 
the CEOs stock and option portfolio for a $1,000 change in firm value. Tenure (Q1) is an indicator that is 
equal to 1 for firms-years were the tenure of the CEO is 4 or less years; Tenure (Q2) is an indicator that is 
equal to 1 for firms-years were the tenure of the CEO is 5 to 8 years. Tenure (Q3) is an indicator that is 
equal to 1 for firms-years were the tenure of the CEO is 9 to 12 years; Tenure (Q4) is an indicator that is 
equal to 1 for firms-years were the tenure of the CEO is 13 or more years. Ln(Number of Roundst-1) is equal 
to the natural log of the number of rounds recorded by the CEO in the prior fiscal year. Ln(Number of 
Roundst-1)*Tenure(Q1), Ln(Number of Roundst-1)*Tenure(Q2), Ln(Number of Roundst-1)*Tenure(Q4), 
Ln(Number of Roundst-1)* Tenure(Q4) allow the impact of prior golf vary based on CEO tenure. 
 
VARIABLES 
Pay Performance 
Sensitivity CEO Turnover (1/0) 
          Enterprise Valuet-1 -0.352*** -0.354*** 0.428*** 0.439*** 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
MTBt-1 -0.112 -0.103 0.498* 0.521** 
(0.347) (0.394) (0.0507) (0.0362) 
Returnst-1 0.135 0.142 -1.035** -1.061*** 
(0.773) (0.762) (0.0139) (0.00962) 
Return Volatilityt-1 4.098** 4.112** 1.800* 1.816* 
(0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0550) (0.0556) 
Sales Growth -0.237 -0.228 -1.131 -1.096 
(0.684) (0.694) (0.127) (0.140) 
Tenure (Q1) -0.752** -1.685** -0.330 -1.649* 
(0.0484) (0.0179) (0.470) (0.0859) 
Tenure (Q2) -0.433 -0.781 -0.270 -0.326 
(0.196) (0.178) (0.478) (0.656) 
Tenure (Q3) 0.201 -0.123 -0.0883 0.00205 
(0.647) (0.864) (0.812) (0.998) 
Ln(Number Roundst-1) 0.0208 0.216* 
(0.677) (0.0517) 
Ln(Number Roundst-1) * Tenure Q1 0.327*** 0.700** 
(0.00734) (0.0225) 
Ln(Number Roundst-1) * Tenure Q2 0.0234 0.130 
(0.753) (0.525) 
Ln(Number Roundst-1) * Tenure Q3 0.0154 0.0926 
(0.884) (0.671) 
Ln(Number Roundst-1) * Tenure Q4 -0.161 0.108 
(0.272) (0.621) 
Industry and Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,095 1,095 703 703 
R-squared 0.141 0.144 0.151 0.159 
  
Figure 1 – Distribution of 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of firm-year observations by the frequency of golf for
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Observations by Frequency of Golf 
 363 CEOs of S&P 1500 firms from 2008 to 2012.  Rounds for each CEO
er of rounds played.  
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 Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of firm-year observation by Fama
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– Distribution of Samples by Industry 
-French 12 industry for 363 CEOs of S&P 1500 firms and the universe of S&P 1500 firms from 
 
Fama-French 12 Industry
 
Golfing CEO Sample
Execucomp
 Figure 3 – Average Frequency of Golf by CEOs 
Figure 3 shows the average number of golf rounds recorded by
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– 2008 to 2012 
 363 CEOs of S&P 1500 firms from 2008 to 2012. Rounds for each CEO
ds played.  
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Abstract 
 
 The separation of ownership and control is a defining characteristic of the modern 
corporation and investors rely on accurate and timely financial statements to monitor the 
performance of the firm and its managers. The management of the financial reporting 
process is widely considered the responsibility of the chief financial officer (CFO) and 
the quality of a firm’s financial reports is a function of the ability and the effort of the 
CFO. Prior studies have linked CFO ability to reporting quality, but the difficulty of 
observing executive effort has prevented prior studies from linking effort to reporting 
quality. In this study, I use CFO golf records to measure leisure consumption, which 
serves as a proxy for effort. I document that high levels of leisure consumption are 
associated with lower quality financial reporting, which supports the argument that CFO 
effort is an important determinant of financial reporting quality. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The separation of ownership and control is a defining characteristic of the modern 
corporation and investors rely on accurate and timely financial statements to monitor the 
performance of the firm and its managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The management 
of the financial reporting process is widely considered the responsibility of the chief 
financial officer (CFO) and prior studies provide empirical evidence supporting the 
importance of individual CFOs in the financial reporting process (Aier et al. 2005; Chava 
and Purnanandam 2010; Ge et al. 2011; Li et al. 2010).  Despite the importance of high 
quality financial reports, the underlying process by which these reports are created is a 
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“black box” to investors. Therefore, stakeholders rely on the individuals involved in the 
process to provide quality information.  
Existing literature documents the impact of CFO gender, experience, 
compensation structure, and professional qualifications on the financial reporting quality 
of a firm (Aier et al. 2005; Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Jiang et al. 2010; Li et al. 
2010). The impact of the CFO on the financial reporting quality of a firm, however, is 
driven by both the skill set of the CFO as well as the effort provided by the individual. 
Because of the difficulty in measuring executive effort, prior research has been unable to 
examine the impact of CFO effort on financial reporting quality. To overcome this 
measurement hurdle, I use CFO leisure consumption as a direct proxy for CFO effort.  
To measure the leisure consumption of CFOs, I use a detailed database of golf 
records maintained by the United States Golf Association (USGA). This database, the 
Golf Handicap and Information Network (GHIN), is used to maintain and track the 
handicaps of participating golfers. Peer review is an important component of the USGA 
handicapping program and participating golfers are expected to maintain an accurate 
handicap by entering all of their rounds played into the system. For this study, I identify 
and hand collect golf records for 385 CFOs from 2008 to 2012 to proxy for their leisure 
consumption and inversely, the effort they provide in fulfilling their fiduciary 
responsibilities to their firm and its shareholders. 
These golf records provide unique insight into the time allocated by CFOs to 
leisure activities. The database contains round-by-round records from 2008 to 2012 and 
for each round, the system contains the calendar month and year of the round, the 
player’s score, the relative difficulty of the course, if the round was played where the 
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golfer maintains a membership, and if the round was played as part of a tournament. The 
high level of detail in the database along with the length of the sample period provides 
unique insight into the labor/leisure tradeoff of these CFOs. I argue that golf frequency is 
a valid measure of leisure consumption because of the popularity of the sport among 
executives and the significant time commitment represented by a single round of golf. 
The average CFO in this sample records 20 rounds of golf per fiscal year in the GHIN 
system, which represents a substantial amount of time away from the office. Assuming an 
average round takes five hours, this translates to 2.5 weeks of the year allocated to 
playing golf. The data also reveals considerable variation in the time allocated to golf as 
13.4 percent of those in the sample do not record any rounds in a year and 10 percent 
record 46 or more rounds in a year. To the extent that observations with few recorded 
rounds are associated with under-reporting or allocation of time to other leisure activities, 
this measure underestimates the leisure consumed by executives and therefore, biases 
against finding results.  
Using this sample of golf records, I directly test how the CFO’s effort impacts her 
performance as judged by the generation of high quality financial reports (the outcome of 
her primary fiduciary duty). In particular, I perform two related analyses using golf 
records of CFOs. First, I examine the effect of CFO effort on the financial reporting 
quality of a firm. Second, I investigate the effect of CFO effort on the market’s 
perception of corporate financial reporting quality. 
Given the vital role that the CFO performs in the financial reporting process of a 
firm, I predict that both the actual and perceived financial reporting quality of a firm will 
be higher as the CFO exerts more effort. Using the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
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and unexplained audit fees to measure actual reporting quality (Hribar et al. 2013; Chen 
et al. 2011; Dehaan et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2002), I document that greater leisure 
consumption by the CFO is associated with lower quality financial reporting. This 
finding is consistent with the importance of the CFO in the financial reporting process 
and the impact of her effort on the firm’s financial reporting quality. The impact of CFO 
effort on financial reporting quality is also economically meaningful. Based on the model 
coefficients, a one standard deviation decrease in golf frequency is associated with a 6.9 
percent reduction in the use of discretionary accruals. 
Furthermore, market participants appear to be aware of the difference in financial 
reporting quality based on the effort provided by CFOs. Specifically, I find a significant 
relation between increased CFO effort and the market’s perception of reporting quality as 
indicated by higher earnings response coefficients and less dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts (Baber et al. 2014; Behn et al. 2008; Dehaan et al. 2013). These analyses 
provide evidence that the more time the CFO spends fulfilling his firm responsibilities, 
the greater the perceived financial reporting quality of the firm. Furthermore, CFO effort 
is related to the provision of timely financial information to investors and other 
stakeholders as evidenced by a positive association between CFO leisure consumption 
and number of days to file an annual earnings announcement. On average, it takes firms 2 
days longer to announce annual earnings when the CFO has played more than the median 
amount of golf during the fiscal year. 
Endogeneity is a perpetual concern for empirical researchers as it is impossible to 
fully observe and control for all relevant information. In this study, I address endogeneity 
driven by unobservable firm characteristics using models that employ firm fixed effects. I 
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find that the relation between golf frequency and financial reporting quality is robust to 
the inclusion of firm-fixed effects. These results reduce concerns that CFO golf 
frequency is correlated with firm characteristics that drive financial reporting quality. 
The findings of this study make several contributions to the accounting and 
corporate governance literature. First, this is the only study, to my knowledge, that 
directly examines one of the most crucial determinants of a CFO’s performance – the 
effort the CFO puts into his duties as the financial reporting process manager of the firm. 
Second, I present evidence of variation in CFO effort, which has not been previously 
explored.  Third, this study confirms the critical role that an individual CFO plays in the 
creation and distribution of a firm’s financial reports by revealing the positive association 
between CFO effort and actual as well as perceived financial reporting quality.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II develops 
hypotheses.  Section III outlines the research method and Section IV presents the results. 
The final section concludes. 
II. Development of Hypothesis 
 
 Due to the separation of ownership and control in corporations, financial reports 
are relied upon to transmit information from managers to company shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Investors use firms’ annual reports to judge the performance of the 
firm and its management. Given investor reliance on financial reporting, the accuracy and 
overall quality of the information provided is of utmost importance. Prior literature 
documents the benefits of high quality financial reporting, including capital allocation 
efficiency (Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009) and lower debt and equity cost of 
capital (Aboody et al. 2005; Francis et al. 2005). Furthermore, low quality financial 
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reporting can be a leading indicator of financial statement fraud, accounting restatements, 
and regulatory issues, which have significant consequences for shareholder value and 
often result in executive turnover (Hribar et al. 2013). 
 Within an organization, the individual with the most influence over the financial 
reporting process is the CFO. Although CEOs and other executives are involved in firm 
reporting, the “primary responsibility for the management of the financial system lies 
with the CFO” (Mian 2001). The importance of the CFO in financial reporting was 
underscored in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). In particular, 
Section 302 of SOX mandates that the CFO of publicly traded companies personally 
certify the appropriateness of financial statements and disclosures (Marden et al. 2006). 
Certifying financial statements that do not fairly present the operations and financial 
condition of the company could cause CFOs to face up to five years in prison, fines, and 
SEC bars against serving as a corporate officer or director (Marden et al. 2006). This 
requirement provides a regulatory acknowledgement of an individual CFO’s influence 
over the financial reporting process of firms.  
While prior literature has established the important role that individual CFOs play 
in the financial reporting practices of companies, many of these studies focus on 
characteristics of CFOs, such as gender, financial expertise, and incentive structure, and 
link these traits to various firm-level outputs. For instance, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find 
that firms with female executives are associated with lower levels of growth and are less 
likely to issue debt.21 Barua et al. (2010) also examine the effects of CFO gender on the 
firm and reveal that companies with female CFOs have lower discretionary accruals.  
                                                 
21
 Although the authors include CEOs and CFOs in their study, they note that the vast majority of 
the female executives in their sample are CFOs (Huang and Kisgen 2013).  
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Other studies investigate the impact of individual CFO’s qualifications on a firm’s 
financial reporting practices. This research reports a reduced likelihood of financial 
restatements for firms led by CFOs with more work experience as a CFO, advanced 
degrees (i.e., MBA), and professional designations (i.e., CPA) (Aier et al. 2005). In 
addition, companies with more experienced and better qualified CFOs (as measured by 
longer tenure as a CFO and a CPA designation) are associated with a lower propensity to 
receive an adverse SOX 404 opinion (Li et al. 2010).  
Furthermore, prior literature documents the impact of a CFO’s personal wealth 
portfolio on the financial reporting quality of the firm (Chava and Purnanandam 2010). 
More specifically, stronger equity incentives for the CFO are associated with a greater 
use of discretionary accruals (Jiang et al. 2010). In recent years, public companies have 
reduced the percentage of CFO bonuses contingent on financial performance in hopes of 
properly aligning the CFO’s incentives with her significant fiduciary responsibility of 
reporting accurate financial results (Indjejikian and MatĚJka 2009).  
In addition to examining the effects of observable CFO attributes on a firm’s 
financial reporting, researchers have acknowledged the presence of unobservable CFO 
characteristics that likely account for significant differences among companies’ 
accounting and reporting practices. Prior studies rely on methods such as manager fixed 
effects, executive turnover, and surveys to examine unobservable CFO traits that 
comprise an executive’s “style”. Ge et al. (2011), for example, find that CFO fixed 
effects significantly explain firms’ discretionary accruals, accounting for leases, pension 
return estimates, and financial restatement likelihood. Similarly, Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) demonstrate that individual manager fixed effects significantly impact firm 
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performance as well as investment and organizational practices of companies, including 
acquisition decisions and dividend policies. Prior research also uses manager fixed effects 
to document that CFOs exert a greater influence on abnormal accruals than CEOs 
(Dejong and Ling 2013).  
Additionally, Geiger and North (2006) exploit CFO turnover to reveal that an 
individual CFO impacts a firm’s financial reports as evidenced by a significant decrease 
in discretionary accruals after the appointment of a new CFO. Surveys and interviews of 
CFOs also reveal that executives admit to managing earnings despite recognizing the 
negative long-term consequences to firm value (Graham et al. 2005). Finally, Demerjian 
et al. (2013) measure managerial ability by computing a score based on the portion of a 
firm’s total efficiency (i.e., the generation of revenues given a set of resources) that is not 
explained by observable firm characteristics. The authors reveal a positive association 
between managerial ability and earnings quality as demonstrated by fewer restatements, 
more persistent earnings, lower errors in the allowance for doubtful accounts, and higher 
quality accruals for firms with “better” managers.22 
The quality of a CFO’s work is not only a function of her training and experience, 
but is also a direct product of the effort the CFO provides fulfilling her responsibilities.  
While prior literature has documented the impact of the CFO’s expertise, experience, 
incentives, and “style” on a company’s financial reporting practices, no study to my 
knowledge has looked at the effort the CFO exerts in performing his or her duties. I 
therefore seek to fill this void by examining how the CFO’s effort is associated with the 
                                                 
22
 The managerial ability measure is calculated for the entire management team, including the 
CFO. While the authors note that they would like to focus on CFOs and their delegates, they 
explain that they cannot disentangle the ability score for members of the executive team. In 
additional analysis, however, the authors examine CFO switches and find that firms that acquire a 
more able CFO experience an improvement in earnings quality (Demerjian et al. 2013). 
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firm’s financial reporting quality. Given that “CFOs are the direct producers of earnings 
quality”, “make the key decisions on how to apply accounting standards in their 
company”, and determine “whether to use or abuse discretion in financial reporting”, I 
expect the level of an individual’s CFO effort to significantly impact the firm’s financial 
reporting quality (Dichev et al. 2013). As such, I state the following hypothesis in its 
alternative form: 
H1: The financial reporting quality of a firm is higher when the CFO exerts more effort. 
 A CFO’s effort to perform his duties is likely to not only impact a firm’s actual 
financial reporting quality, but is also apt to affect the market’s perception of a 
company’s reporting quality. Prior literature demonstrates that market participants 
consider the individual occupying the CFO position of a firm in their decisions. Brochet 
et al. (2014), for instance, reveal that analysts follow executives, the majority of which 
are CFOs, who move between publicly listed firms. Specifically, the authors find that 
analysts covering the manager’s previous firm initiate coverage of the executive’s new 
firm after an executive switches companies (Brochet et al. 2014). Investors also seem to 
react to the profiles of individual executives as evidenced by the decline in earnings 
response coefficients after the firm hires an individual affiliated with the firm’s external 
auditor (Baber et al. 2014). Given market participants’ interest in the individuals holding 
executive positions and the critical role that CFOs serve in the financial reporting of firms, 
I expect that the market will consider the quality of a firm’s financial reporting to be 
higher when the CFO spends more time fulfilling her responsibilities. I therefore state the 
following hypothesis in its alternative form: 
H2: Market participants perceive the financial reporting quality of a firm as higher when 
the CFO exerts more effort. 
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III. Methodology 
 
3.1. Measure of CFO Effort 
 
 The difficulty in monitoring the effort provided by management is a central 
component of the agency problem faced by shareholders. This monitoring problem also 
prevents financial economists from analyzing the relation between executive effort and 
firm-level outputs. A direct measure of effort, such as hours spent at the office, is not 
currently feasible to collect for executives. In this study, I use an observable measure of 
leisure consumption to proxy for the effort provided by CFOs. Given that time is a finite 
resource, the amount of time allocated to leisure directly reduces the pool of time that can 
be devoted to firm related tasks. 
 I utilize a detailed database of self-reported golf records to measure the leisure 
consumption for a sample of CFOs. The GHIN system is maintained by the USGA and 
serves as a tool for the calculation and verification of golfers’ handicaps. A golfer’s 
handicap is calculated based on her prior scores and maintaining a handicap allows a 
golfer to compete with other golfers with different skill levels. Golfers that maintain a 
handicap are strongly encouraged to enter all permissible rounds into the GHIN system to 
ensure an accurate handicap and to facilitate verification by other golfers. The round-by-
round history found in the GHIN system contains all of the rounds submitted by the 
golfer and includes the month and year of the round, the golfer’s score, the course rating 
and slope, and whether the round was played at the golfer’s home course. The GHIN 
system is widely populated starting in 2008, but the length of each player’s history is 
driven by the date her regional association became affiliated with the USGA. 
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 A single round of golf consists of 18 holes and represents a significant time 
commitment. The pace-of-play at a typical golf course is 4 hours and 15 minutes from 
start to finish, not including any time spent checking in or practicing prior to the round. A 
total time commitment of 5 to 6 hours is a reasonable estimate for a single round given 
time spent commuting to the course, practicing prior to the round, and socializing after 
the round. Prior literature has found that many executives maintain golf course 
memberships at vacation destinations away from their corporate headquarters (Yermack 
2006), which indicates that some rounds may constitute an even greater time commitment. 
 Golf is a popular leisure activity among CFOs with approximately 20 percent of 
CFOs covered by Execucomp maintaining a GHIN account. Further evidence of the 
popularity of golf among CFOs is found in a 1998 survey, which reveals that the most 
popular past time for CFOs is golf with 21 percent of the sample reporting it as their 
favorite activity (Accountemps 1998). The widespread popularity of golf allows for a 
broad cross-section of firms to be included in the analysis, which assists in validating golf 
frequency as a measure of CFO leisure consumption. 
 A potential critique of using golf to measure executive leisure consumption is the 
notion that golf provides valuable networking and business discussion opportunities. To 
the extent that CFOs are discussing business on the golf course, this would bias against 
finding results linking high leisure consumption to low quality financial reporting. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to justify the high golf frequency of many CFOs as necessary 
in the function the executive serves in the firm given that an increase in networking or 
business opportunities is unlikely to impact financial reporting quality. A secondary 
critique of using golf to measure leisure consumption is the possibility that CFOs that 
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play little golf are consuming other types of leisure such as tennis. This possibility would 
result in overestimating the effort provided by CFOs with infrequent golf, which would 
ultimately bias against finding results.23  
3.2. Financial Reporting Quality Analysis 
 
 I use two proxies found in prior literature to measure financial reporting quality, 
namely the absolute value of discretionary accruals and unexplained audit fees (Chen et 
al. 2011; Hribar et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2002; Dehaan et al. 2013). Total accruals are 
comprised of nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Nondiscretionary 
accruals reflect the portion of accruals created by a firm’s growth and its operating cycle 
while discretionary accruals represent management choices outside of a firm’s business 
conditions. Therefore, discretionary accruals are used as proxy for the quality of a firm’s 
financial reporting within management control. Higher levels of discretionary accruals 
represent lower financial reporting quality.24 Following Chen et al. (2011), I compute the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals as managers have incentives to manage earnings 
both up and down. I estimate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model with 
an adjustment for firm performance as suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) and run the 
following regression for each combination of two-digit SIC industry codes and years with 
at least 20 observations: 
Total  Accrualsi,t
Total  Assetsi,t-1
=α0 +α1
1
Total Assetsi,t-1
+α2
∆Salesi,t
Total  Assetsi,t-1
+α3
Net  PPEi,t
Total  Assetsi,t-1
+α4ROAi,t +εi,t         (1)
        
 
                                                 
23
 A related critique is that golfers with few recorded rounds are more likely to be under-reporting 
their rounds. This would also bias against finding results. 
24
 A potential concern with using discretionary accruals to measure financial reporting quality is 
the notion that discretionary accruals can proxy for earnings manipulations by a firm’s managers. 
To address this concern, I analyze the relation between CFO golf frequency and the propensity to 
meet or just beat earnings targets and fail to document a significant relation. 
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Discretionary accruals (DA) are represented by the difference between the fitted values of 
accruals estimated by equation (1) and the firm’s actual accruals. In order to capture both 
income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals, I use the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals i.e., ABS(DA). All variables in equation (1) are defined in 
Appendix 1.  
 The second proxy for financial reporting quality is unexplained audit fees. Hribar 
et al. (2013) developed this measure to leverage the firm-specific knowledge possessed 
by the auditor. By removing the explained portion of a firm’s audit fees, the remaining 
portion represents additional testing required by the auditor and/or a larger risk-premium 
being charged by the auditor due to poor financial reporting quality. Therefore, higher 
unexplained audit fees are associated with lower quality financial reporting. Hribar et al. 
(2013) document that unexplained audit fees are incrementally predictive of fraud, 
restatements, and SEC comment letters when controlling for other measures of financial 
reporting quality. To compute unexplained audit fees, I first run the following audit fee 
model from Hribar et al. (2013) for each year and total assets decile:  
          
(2) 
The residual from equation (2) represents the unexplained audit fee (UAF) for each 
observation. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables found in 
equation (2).  
 The following model is used to perform a multivariate analysis of the relation 
between a CFO’s effort and the firm’s financial reporting quality: 
Ln(AuditFeei,t )= β0 +β1Big4i,t +β2Ln(Assetsi,t )+β3BusSegi,t + β4FGNi,t +β5INVi,t
                        +β6RECi,t +β7CRi,t +β8BTM i,t +β9LEVi,t +β10EMPLSi,t +β11MERGERi,t
                        +β12DecYEi,t +β13ROAi,t +β14Lossi,t +β15AudOpini,t + β16Clienti,t + β17IPOi,t
                        +β18LitRiski,t +ΣINDi,t +εi,t
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ABS(DA)i,t  or UAFi,t = β0 +β1Number Roundsi,t +β2Ln(MVEi,t )+β3Ln(MTBi,t )+β4Leveragei,t
                                     +β5Std. CFOi,t-4  to t +β6ROAi,t + β7ROAi,t−1 + β8Growthi,t + β9Inst. Own.i,t
                                     +β10BigNi,t +β11Numesti,t +β12Ext. Fin.i,t  +ΣINDi,t +ΣYear +εi,t
      
(3) 
As explained in the previous section, I measure CFO effort by capturing the CFO’s 
leisure consumption, which represents the inverse of his or her effort. CFO leisure 
consumption is operationalized through the use of the individuals’ annual golf frequency. 
The variable of interest in equation (3) is Number_Rounds, which equals the number of 
rounds of golf a CFO plays in a given year. The dependent variables, ABS(DA) and UAF, 
represent the absolute value of discretionary accruals and unexplained audit fees, 
respectively. The greater the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the higher the 
unexplained audit fees, the lower the financial reporting quality of the firm. Therefore, as 
described in Section II, I predict that the coefficient on Number_Rounds will be positive 
and statistically significant because I expect that greater CFO leisure consumption effort 
to be associated with lower financial reporting quality as proxied by higher discretionary 
accruals and unexplained audit fees. This expectation is consistent with a positive impact 
of CFO effort on financial reporting quality.  
 Following Yu (2008), equation (3) controls for firm size (LnMVE), market-to-
book ratio (LnMTB), leverage (Leverage), cash flow volatility (Std.CFO), profitability 
(ROA), growth rate of assets (Growth), ownership structure (Inst.Own), auditor (BigN), 
analyst coverage (Numest), and external financing activity (Ext.Fin). In addition, I 
include industry and year fixed effects to take into account differences in financial 
reporting quality across industries and time. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
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3.3. Market Perception Analysis 
 
 To examine the effects of CFO effort on the market’s perception of financial 
reporting quality, I utilize two proxies found in prior studies: analyst forecast dispersion 
and earnings response coefficients (Baber et al. 2014; Dehaan et al. 2013; Behn et al. 
2008). Analyst forecast dispersion provides insight into analysts’ information 
environment. If the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is lower, the perceived quality of the 
financial reporting process is considered to be greater as the analysts are placing more 
reliance on this information in their forecasts (Dehaan et al. 2013). Earnings response 
coefficients are estimated on the assumption that unexpected earnings should be quickly 
priced into a firm’s stock price. If the market has greater confidence in the earnings 
reported by management, then the stock price reaction to unexpected earnings should be 
larger in magnitude (Dehaan et al. 2013).   
 I use the following model to test the relation between CFO effort and the market’s 
perception of a company’s financial reporting process: 
Dispersioni,t = β0 +β1Number Roundsi,t  +β2Numest +β3Ln(MVEi,t )+ β4Betai,t
                       +β5Std. CFOi,t-4  to t +β6BigNi,t + β7Horizoni,t−1 +β8Surprisei,t
                       +β9Inst. Own.i,t + β10Restatementi,t +ΣINDi,t +ΣYear +εi,t
       
(4) 
Dispersion equals the standard deviation of analyst forecasts from the most recent 
consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement scaled by the stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year (Behn et al. 2008; Dehaan et al. 2013). As in the previously 
described financial quality analysis, the variable of interest is Number_Rounds. 
Following H2, I expect the market’s perception of financial reporting quality to improve 
as the CFO’s effort increases. I therefore predict that the coefficient on Number_Rounds 
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will be positive and statistically significant, as more leisure consumed by a CFO (i.e., less 
effort) should be related to greater forecast dispersion among analysts (i.e., lower 
perceived financial reporting quality).  
 As in Behn et al. (2008) and Dehaan et al. (2013), I control for the number of 
analysts covering the firm (Numest), firm size (LnMVE), risk (Beta), cash flow volatility 
(StdCFO), auditor (BigN), the forecast horizon (Horizon), year-over-year earnings 
surprise (Surprise), ownership structure (InstOwn), and the announcement of a 
restatement during the fiscal year (Restatement). In addition, I include industry and year 
fixed effects to capture potential changes in analyst forecast dispersion over time and 
across industries. Please see Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions.  
 The second analysis for the market’s perception of the financial reporting process 
uses earnings response coefficients. Following Baber et al. (2014), I employ the 
following regression to examine the impact of CFO effort on the market’s perception of a 
firm’s financial reporting process:  
       
(5) 
The dependent variable (CAR) is the two-day market adjusted return beginning on the 
annual earnings announcement date. Earnings surprise (SUE) is the difference between 
the actual earnings per share of the firm minus the mean consensus forecast scaled by the 
stock price at the beginning of the quarter. The variable of interest (Number_Rounds) is 
interacted with SUE in order to test the earnings response to the CFO’s leisure 
consumption. In line with H2, I predict the coefficient on the interaction of 
Number_Rounds and SUE (β3) to be negative and statistically significant as I expect the 
CARi,t = β0 +β1SUEi,t + β2 Number Roundsi,t + β3(SUEi,t × Number  Roundsi,t )
             +β4Ln(MVEi,t )+ β5Lossi,t +β6Ln(MTBi,t )+β7Leveragei,t + β8Betai,t +β9Restatementi,t
             + SUEi,t β10Ln(MVEi,t )+β11Lossi,t + β12Ln(MTBi,t )+β13Leveragei,t + β14Betai,t +β15Restatementi,t( )
              +ΣINDi,t + ΣYear +εi,t
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market to perceive financial reporting quality as lower when there is greater CFO leisure 
consumption (i.e, less CFO effort).  
 Equation (5) also includes controls for firm size (LnMVE), negative earnings per 
share (Loss), market-to-book ratio (LnMTB), leverage (Leverage), firm risk (Beta), and 
the announcement of a restatement during the fiscal year (Restatement). Each of these 
control variables is interacted with the earnings surprise (SUE). As in the prior analyses, I 
include year and industry fixed effects given likely variations in earnings response 
coefficients across time and industries. 
3.4. Sample Construction 
 
 To construct my sample of CFOs and their golfing records, I first identify all 
CFOs in the Execucomp database from 2008 to 2012. I then match these 2,846 
individuals to the Golf Handicap and Information Network (GHIN) website, which is 
maintained by the United States Golf Association (USGA) and provides the largest 
handicap computation service to over 2.3 million golfers worldwide (GHIN 2014). The 
golf handicap records for the CFOs are identified by manually searching for the 
individual’s first and last name as well as the state where the firm’s corporate 
headquarters is located. Possible matches are evaluated based on the distance from 
corporate headquarters to the golf club identified.25  In addition, CFOs with multiple 
matches in the general proximity of corporate headquarters are excluded from the sample 
given the difficulty in identifying the appropriate individual’s record. Based on these 
requirements, 595 CFOs are matched to golf records on the GHIN website.  
                                                 
25
 Club proximity is evaluated using a cut-off of 60 miles from the firm’s headquarters. I exclude 
matches that identified municipal courses or courses with a low cost daily fee to ensure that only 
exclusive club memberships are included in the sample. 
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 Of these 595 CFOs, however, 80 individuals either did not input any rounds of 
golf or played their first round after their tenure as CFO. I only include the 515 
individuals with golf records overlapping with their time as a CFO, which corresponds to 
1,594 firm-year observations. To be included in the analysis, the observations must 
contain sufficient data to compute the variation in prior cash flows from Compustat and 
the analyst information from I/B/E/S. Additionally, observations related to firms in the 
financial industry are excluded due to the documented differences in regulatory and 
accounting practices of these companies. The final sample is comprised of 1,126 firm-
year observations related to 385 CFOs. Please refer to Table 10 for more detail on the 
sample selection procedures as well as information on the samples used in each analysis.   
IV. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Panel A of Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics of the firm-year 
observations used in this study. The average CFO records 20 rounds of golf per year in 
the GHIN system, which represents a significant time commitment to leisure activity. The 
minimum number of rounds in the top quartile (decile) of the sample distribution is 30 
(46) rounds and the maximum number of rounds is 148. Based on definitions provided by 
the USGA, more than 66 percent of the CFOs in the sample are classified as “Core” or 
“Avid” golfers. Additionally, the average (median) firm-year reports sales of $8 billion 
($2 billion), assets of $9 billion ($2.5 billion), and market value of equity of $9 billion 
($2 billion). Although the sample is biased toward large firms, there is significant 
variation in company size with the bottom 10 percent of observations documenting sales 
less than $360 million and the top 10 percent documenting sales in excess of nearly $17 
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billion. Furthermore, the firms analyzed in this study are profitable with an average and 
median return on assets of approximately 6 percent. The sample firms also have a high 
level of institutional ownership (greater than 67 percent) and are followed by an average 
of 11 analysts.   
 In addition, the sample of firm-years matched to CFO golf records appears to be 
representative of the overall population of firms covered by the Execucomp database. As 
shown in Panel B of Table 11, there are few significant differences between firms 
employing golfers as CFOs compared to firms with non-golfers as CFOs. The firms in 
the sub-samples are similar in size and report comparable leverage, profitability, growth, 
and institutional ownership. However, the firms employing CFOs with golfing records do 
appear to be more mature as they have substantially less variation in cash flows, are 
significantly older firms, and have greater analyst coverage, which is consistent with the 
sport’s popularity among the more traditional, old economy actors. 
  Panel C of Table 11 compares the characteristics of firm-years during which the 
CFO played at or above the median frequency of golf rounds to the firm-years where the 
CFO played below the median frequency. This analysis reveals that there are no 
reportable variations in firm size, sales, return on assets, leverage, cash flow volatility, 
and institutional ownership. Given this analysis, there does not appear to be a systematic 
sorting of high-leisure CFOs to small firms where they may have a greater opportunity to 
consume leisure due to less demanding or stringent regulatory and reporting 
requirements. 
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4.2. Results of Financial Reporting Quality Analysis  
 
 Table 12 reports the results of the financial reporting quality examination. 
Column 1 presents the regression analysis of equation (3) with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (AbsDA) as the dependent variable. As predicted, the coefficient on 
Number_Rounds is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. This indicates 
that as CFOs allocate more time to leisure, the quality of financial reporting decreases. 
The coefficient estimate of 0.000168 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in 
the frequency of golf by the CFO is associated with 6.85 percent higher use of accruals, 
which highlights the economic significance of CFO effort on financial reporting quality. 
Using unexplained audit fees (UAF) as an additional proxy for financial reporting quality, 
column 2 reveals similar results as the coefficient estimate for the number of golf rounds 
is 0.00146 and statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. These results provide evidence 
that as the CFO’s consumption of leisure increases (or the CFO’s effort decreases), the 
financial reporting quality of the firm decreases as proxied by higher absolute 
discretionary accruals and unexplained audit fees. The model estimates indicate that a 1 
standard deviation increase in golf frequency is associated with a 3% increase in 
unexplained audit fees.  
4.3. Results of Market Perception Analysis  
 
  Table 13 presents the results of the regression analysis of equation (4), which uses 
analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for the market’s perception of financial reporting 
quality. Column 1 reports the results without controlling for the use of a Big 4 auditor, 
the announcement of a restatement in the fiscal year, the consensus horizon, or the year-
over-year earnings surprise. From this base specification, column 2 adds controls for the 
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auditor, the consensus horizon, and the year-over-year earnings surprise. Column 3 
presents the results of this analysis using the full set of control variables as listed in 
equation (4). Across all three specifications, the coefficient on Number_Rounds is 
positive and significant at the p<0.05 level, suggesting that the greater the leisure 
consumption by the CFO (or the lower the CFO’s effort), the lower the market’s 
perception of financial reporting quality as measured by higher analyst forecast 
dispersion. In the third specification, the coefficient estimate on Number_Rounds is 
0.0000566, which indicates that a one standard deviation change in the frequency of golf 
is associated with a 41.5 percent increase in analyst dispersion (based on the sample 
mean). This increase is highly economically significant and demonstrates the importance 
of CFO effort on analysts’ perception of financial reporting quality.   
 The results of the earnings response coefficient analysis are reported in Table 14. 
Column 1 provides results for equation (5) without including the control variables while 
column 2 reports the results of the full specification. In both columns, the coefficient on 
the interaction between the number of rounds of golf and the earnings surprise 
(Number_Rounds X SUE) is negative and highly significant at the p<0.01 level. This 
indicates that market participants have significantly less faith in the earning surprise as 
they incorporate less of the surprise into the price of the stock. This finding supports H2 
as it provides evidence that the market perceives financial reporting quality as lower 
when the CFO provides less effort. 
 
V. Additional Analysis and Robustness 
 
 To provide further evidence on the impact of CFO effort on financial reporting 
quality, I examine another aspect of reporting quality – the timeliness of firm filings. 
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Market participants view earnings announcements and 10-K filings as important 
information events and prior studies report negative market reactions to late filings 
(Impink et al. 2012). I use two related measures of timeliness: (1) the number of days 
between the end of the fiscal year and the earning announcement date and (2) firm 
notification to the SEC that it is unable to comply with the regulatory 10-K filing 
deadline. I use multivariate regressions to analyze the relation between CFO leisure 
consumption and the timeliness of financial reporting. 
 In the first specification, the dependent variable is Reporting Lag, which equals 
the number of days between the end of the firm’s fiscal year and the date of the annual 
earnings announcement. As in the previous analyses, the variable of interest is the CFO’s 
golf frequency (Number_Rounds). I also control for differences in timeliness driven by 
firm characteristics, including size (Ln_MVE), market-to-book ratio (Ln_MTB), leverage, 
cash flow volatility (Std_CFO) current and lagged return on assets (ROA), asset growth 
(Growth), institutional ownership (InstOwn), Big 4 auditor (Big4), analyst following 
(Numest), and external financing activities (ExtFin). 
As reported in Table 15, I find a positive and significant association between CFO 
leisure consumption and a firm’s reporting lag. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on 
Number of Rounds is 0.0894 (p-value <0.001), which indicates that the reporting lag 
increases as CFO effort decreases. The coefficient estimate indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in golf frequency increases the time it takes to bring earnings to market 
by almost two days. This analysis demonstrates that CFO effort is correlated with the 
time it takes the company to provide value-relevant information to market participants, 
but it does not establish that high-leisure CFOs are more likely to have trouble compiling 
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with regulatory filing requirements. I explore this possibility in the second specification 
where the dependent variable, Report Late, is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm notified the SEC that the 10-K would not be filed prior to the regulatory deadline. 
The coefficient on Number of Rounds is positive and significant (pvalue=0.081). The 
results from the late filing analysis have to be tempered by the relative infrequency in 
which sample firms actually file late (14 times over the sample period). These additional 
analyses reveal another potential consequence of low CFO effort on the firm and its 
stakeholders – less timely information dissemination.   
Endogeneity is a concern in empirical studies because of the difficulty of 
observing and quantifying all potentially relevant information. In this study, an 
unobservable firm characteristic could drive the relation between CFO golf frequency 
and financial reporting quality. For instance, it could be that a firm’s culture allows for 
excessive golfing and also does not prioritize financial reporting quality. To mitigate the 
concern that an unobservable firm effect, such as firm culture, is driving the results, I 
rerun the analyses of discretionary accruals, unexplained audit fees, and analyst forecast 
dispersion using models that control for unobservable, time-invariant firm effects. The 
coefficient estimates from these analyses are found in Table 16.  
In Panel A, I repeat the discretionary accruals and unexplained audit fees tests 
replacing industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects. The dependent variable in the first 
specification is absolute value of discretionary accruals (AbsDA). Consistent with the 
results presented in Table 3, the coefficient on Number_Rounds is positive and significant 
(p-value=0.023). In column 2, the dependent variable is unexplained audit fees (UAF) 
and in line with the findings from Table 3, the coefficient estimate for Number_Rounds is 
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positive and significant (p-value=0.0402). In Panel B, I rerun the analyst forecast 
dispersion analysis with firm fixed effects rather than industry fixed effects. Across all 
three specifications, the coefficient estimate on Number_Rounds is significant and 
positive at the p<0.05 level. These findings are consistent with the results presented in 
Table 4. Overall, these analyses provide evidence that the relation between CFO golf 
frequency and financial reporting quality is not driven by an unobservable firm 
characteristic. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 The separation of ownership and control imposes the need for management to 
provide high quality financial reports (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The CFO is the 
member of the executive team directly charged with the financial reporting process and 
this study provides insight into the relationship between CFO effort and financial 
reporting quality. I use a measure of CFO leisure consumption to proxy for the effort that 
she provides to her firm and I gauge CFO leisure consumption using a detailed database 
of golf records from 2008 to 2012.  
I examine accounting- and market-based measures of financial reporting to 
analyze the importance of CFO effort. I find statistically significant evidence consistent 
with the notion that greater CFO effort is related to higher financial reporting quality. 
Specifically, I find a positive relation between CFO leisure consumption and the use of 
discretionary accruals and unexplained audit fees. This result indicates that the more time 
the CFO spends consuming leisure (the less time spent fulfilling her duty to the firm), the 
lower the financial reporting quality of the firm.  
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Market participants also appear to recognize the effects of CFO effort on the 
relative quality of company financial reports as greater CFO leisure consumption is 
associated with higher analyst forecast dispersion and lower earnings responses. This 
result provides evidence that analysts as well as investors perceive the financial reporting 
quality of the firm to be higher when the CFO exerts more effort. As an additional 
analysis, I investigate the impact of CFO effort on the timeliness of financial reports. I 
find that higher CFO leisure consumption is associated with increased time to bring 
information to market participants and an increased likelihood of violating regulatory 
filing requirements. 
 These findings contribute to our understanding of a significant determinant of 
financial reporting quality – CFO effort. As market participants and regulators seek to 
improve the quality of financial reporting, this study provides important information 
regarding the individual responsible for the management of this firm process. In 
particular, regulators and other monitors may be able to use the results of this study when 
determining how to better align individual executive’s incentives with those of the firm’s 
stakeholders. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 10 – Sample Selection 
 
Overview of Sample Selection 
Number of CFOs in Execucomp from 2008 to 2012 2,846 
- CFOs that could not be matched to GHIN records 2,251 
Number of CFOs matched to GHIN records 595 
Firm-Year 
Observations 
# of 
CFOs 
Firm-years matched to CFO Golfing Records 1,594 515 
- Firm-years missing prior 4 years of cash flow from 
operations 112 34 
- Financial firms-years 265 77 
- Firm years missing IBES data 91 19 
Overall Sample Size 1,126 385 
Discretionary Accruals Sample 
Overall Sample Size 1,126 385 
- Firm-years missing discretionary accruals 35 10 
Discretionary Accruals Sample 1,091 375 
Unexplained Audit Fee Sample 
Overall Sample Size 1,126 385 
- Firm-years missing unexplained audit fees 31 13 
Unexplained Audit Fee Sample 1,095 372 
Forecast Dispersion Sample 
Overall Sample Size 1,126 385 
- Firm-years with only 1 analyst following 32 9 
Forecast Dispersion Sample 1,094 376 
ERC Sample 
Overall Sample Size 1,126 385 
- Firm-years missing ERC required information 20 4 
ERC Sample 1,106 381 
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Table 11 – Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A provides summary statistics for the sample of firm-years with CFO golf records collected from the 
USGA. Panel B reports mean values of firm characteristics for the sample of firm-years with CFO golf 
records and the sample of firm-years from Execucomp that could not be linked to golf records. The 
difference between the samples is also reported along with the associated p-values. Panel C reports mean 
values of firm characteristics for the sample of firm-years associated with at or above median golf the firm-
years associated with below median golf along with the difference between the two samples and p-values. 
 
Panel A – Golf Sample 
Mean Median p10 p90 N 
Sales  7,869   1,972   329   16,824   1,126  
Assets  8,903   2,465   342   22,250   1,126  
MVE  8,840   2,288   383   18,756   1,126  
MTB 1.51 1.22 0.65 2.68  1,126  
Tobin's Q 1.81 1.48 0.96 3.01  1,126  
Leverage 22.03% 20.46% 0.00% 43.72%  1,126  
ROA 5.75% 5.76% -1.90% 15.20%  1,126  
Std. CFO (5 years) 0.040 0.032 0.012 0.073  1,126  
Institutional Ownership 67.81% 79.11% 0.00% 96.78%  1,126  
ABS(Discretionary Accruals) 5.08% 3.68% 0.65% 10.54%  1,091  
Number of Analyst 11 10 3 21  1,126  
Unexplained Audit Fees 0.024 0.016 -0.479 0.520  1,095  
10-K Reporting Lag 41 40 25 57  1,125  
Number of Rounds of Golf 20 14 0 45  1,126  
 
Panel B – Firm Characteristics by Golf versus Non-Golf 
Golf 
Sample 
Non-
Golf 
Sample Difference P-Value N 
Sales  7,869   6,825  1,043 (0.548) 6,408 
Assets  8,903   8,723  180.0 (0.906) 6,408 
MVE  8,840   7,599  1,240 (0.415) 6,408 
MTB  1.51   1.43  0.0746 (0.245) 6,408 
Tobin's Q  1.81   1.72  0.0846 (0.190) 6,408 
Leverage 22.03% 21.74% 0.00285 (0.796) 6,408 
ROA 5.75% 5.03% 0.00725 (0.145) 6,408 
Std. CFO (5 years) 3.99% 4.62% -0.00631*** (0.00146) 6,408 
Institutional Ownership 67.81% 66.17% 0.0164 (0.386) 6,408 
ABS(Discretionary Accruals) 5.08% 5.62% -0.00542** (0.0147) 6,190 
Number of Analyst  11.35   10.42  0.937** (0.0266) 6,408 
Unexplained Audit Fees 2.38% 4.36% -0.0197 (0.372) 6,234 
10-K Reporting Lag  41   42  -1.471* (0.0517) 6,403 
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Panel C – Firm Characteristics by Golf Frequency 
High 
Golf 
Low 
Golf Difference 
P-
Value N 
Sales  7,916   7,818  98.55 (0.958) 1,126 
Assets  8,724   9,096  -371.4 (0.841) 1,126 
MVE  9,301   8,343  957.8 (0.623) 1,126 
MTB  1.54   1.47  0.0699 (0.479) 1,126 
Tobin's Q  1.84   1.77  0.0721 (0.463) 1,126 
Leverage 22.32% 21.71% 0.00612 (0.721) 1,126 
ROA 5.52% 6.00% -0.00478 (0.531) 1,126 
Std. CFO (5 years) 4.09% 3.88% 0.00216 (0.467) 1,126 
Institutional Ownership 67.33% 68.33% -0.0100 (0.739) 1,126 
ABS(Discretionary Accruals) 5.03% 4.95% 0.000747 (0.830) 1,091 
Number of Analyst  11.46   11.24  0.226 (0.739) 1,126 
Unexplained Audit Fees 5.06% -0.49% 0.0555 (0.134) 1,095 
10-K Reporting Lag  41.75   39.84  1.905 (0.124) 1,125 
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Table 12 – Financial Reporting Quality and CFO Effort 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of proxies of financial reporting quality on CFO 
golf frequency and known determinants of financial reporting quality. The dependent variable in the first 
specification is ABS(Disc. Acc.), which is calculated as the absolute value of discretionary accruals from a 
modified Jones model. The dependent variable in the second specification is Unexplained Audit Fees, 
which is calculated consistent with Hribar et al (2013); higher values of UAF are associated with lower 
quality financial reporting. The variable of interest is the Number of Rounds of Golf, which equal to the 
number of rounds of golf recorded in the GHIN system by the CFO of the firm during the fiscal year. Other 
control variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include indicator variables for the fiscal year 
and industry and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. P-values are reported in 
parentheses and significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients with 
directional predictions are reported using one-tailed tests, otherwise two-tail tests are used. 
 
 
        
VARIABLES Prediction ABS(Disc. Acc.) Unexplained Audit Fees 
        
Number of Rounds of Golf + 0.000168** 0.00146** 
(0.0147) (0.0321) 
Ln(MVE) ? -0.00312 0.0528** 
(0.139) (0.0198) 
Ln(MTB) ? -0.00484 -0.155* 
(0.557) (0.0605) 
Leverage ? -0.00615 0.386*** 
(0.581) (0.00573) 
Std. Dev. CFOt-4 to t ? 0.374*** 0.804 
(7.27e-05) (0.254) 
ROAt ? -0.173*** -0.0139 
(2.24e-05) (0.938) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.102*** -0.0774 
(3.43e-08) (0.485) 
Asset Growth Ratet-1 to t ? 0.0191 -0.0313 
(0.111) (0.543) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.0151** 0.00415 
(0.0157) (0.962) 
Big 4 Auditor (1/0) ? 0.00378 -0.371*** 
(0.711) (0.000535) 
Number of Analyst Following ? -0.000181 -0.00530 
(0.631) (0.131) 
External Financing Activity ? 0.00270 -0.372** 
(0.925) (0.0394) 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,091 1,095 
R-squared   0.353 0.483 
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Table 13 – Analyst Forecast Dispersion and CFO Effort 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of analyst forecast dispersion on CFO golf 
frequency and known determinants of dispersion. The dependent variable is Analyst Forecast Dispersion, 
which is the standard deviation of analyst forecast from the newest consensus forecast prior to the release 
of actual earnings scaled by the stock price at the fiscal year end. Number of Rounds of Golf is equal to the 
number of rounds of golf recorded in the GHIN system by the CFO of the firm during the fiscal year. Other 
control variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include indicator variables for the fiscal year 
and industry and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. P-values are reported in 
parentheses and significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients with 
directional predictions are reported using one-tailed tests, otherwise two-tail tests are used. 
 
          
VARIABLES Prediction Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
          
Number of Rounds of Golf + 0.0000527** 0.0000564** 0.0000566** 
(0.0186) (0.0227) (0.0224) 
Number of Analyst Following ? 0.000117 0.000109 9.30e-05 
(0.188) (0.206) (0.221) 
Ln(MVE) ? -0.00165** -0.00174** -0.00169** 
(0.0238) (0.0243) (0.0242) 
Loss (1/0) ? 0.00809*** 0.00752** 0.00763** 
(0.00619) (0.0117) (0.0108) 
Ln(MTB) ? -0.00177 -0.00157 -0.00149 
(0.229) (0.287) (0.316) 
Beta ? -0.000997 -0.000873 -0.000758 
(0.724) (0.770) (0.799) 
Std. Dev. CFOt-4 to t ? 0.00810 0.00949 0.00882 
(0.660) (0.611) (0.642) 
Big 4 Auditor (1/0) ? 0.00279 0.00271 
(0.137) (0.162) 
Consensus Horizon ? -7.06e-05* -6.81e-05* 
(0.0838) (0.0885) 
Y-o-Y Earning Surprise ? -0.00544 -0.00508 
(0.184) (0.185) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.00205 
(0.378) 
Restatement (1/0) ? 0.00266 
(0.384) 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,094 1,076 1,076 
R-squared   0.272 0.283 0.288 
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Table 14 – Earnings Response Coefficients and CFO Effort 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of earnings announcement abnormal returns 
on the earning surprise, CFO golf frequency, and known determinants of announcement returns. The 
dependent variable is Earning Announcement CAR, which is the cumulative return of the announcing firm 
minus the return of the market on the day of the earnings announcement and the following day. Scaled 
Surprise is the difference between the actual EPS and the analyst consensus EPS scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of the 4th quarter. Number of Rounds of Golf is equal to the number of rounds of golf 
recorded in the GHIN system by the CFO of the firm during the fiscal year. Number of Rounds of Golf * 
Scaled Surprise is the interaction between the two variables. Control variables include Ln(MVE), Negative 
EPS, Leverage, Beta, and Restatement; these control variables are defined in the Appendix. All control 
variables are also interacted with Scaled Surprise. All regressions include indicator variables for the fiscal 
year and industry and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. P-values are reported in 
parentheses and significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients with 
directional predictions are reported using one-tailed tests, otherwise two-tail tests are used. 
 
VARIABLES Prediction 
Earnings Announcement 
CAR 
        
Scaled Surprise ? 0.188 -0.483 
(0.133) (0.342) 
Number of Rounds of Golf ? -0.000201 -0.000195 
(0.146) (0.160) 
Number of Rounds of Golf * Scaled 
Surprise - -0.00773*** -0.0178*** 
(0.000142) (0.000291) 
Control Variables & Interactions No Yes 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,106 1,106 
R-squared   0.172 0.204 
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Table 15 – Timeliness of Financial Reports and CFO Effort 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions financial reporting timeliness on CFO golf 
frequency and known determinants of financial reporting quality. The dependent variable in the first 
specification is 10-K Reporting Lag, which is calculated as the number of days between the end of the 
fiscal year and the date of the earnings announcement. The dependent variable in the second specification is 
Report Late, which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company filed a NT 10-K with the SEC 
indicating that they are unable to comply with the regulator filing deadline. The variable of interest is the 
Number of Rounds of Golf, which equal to the number of rounds of golf recorded in the GHIN system by 
the CFO of the firm during the fiscal year. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. All 
regressions include indicator variables for the fiscal year and industry and standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. P-values are reported in parentheses and significance is denoted as follows: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients with directional predictions are reported using one-tailed tests, 
otherwise two-tail tests are used. 
 
VARIABLES Prediction 10-K Reporting Lag Report Late (1/0) 
        Number of Rounds of Golf + 0.0894*** 0.000229* 
(<0.001) (0.081) 
Ln(MVE) ? -3.071*** 0.00210 
(<0.001) (0.613) 
Ln(MTB) ? -1.174 -0.0138 
(0.587) (0.516) 
Leverage ? 0.680 0.0969* 
(0.829) (0.0654) 
Std. Dev. CFOt-4 to t ? 54.83** 0.0926 
(0.0138) (0.555) 
ROAt ? 0.374 -0.0984 
(0.932) (0.288) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.700 0.0577 
(0.804) (0.307) 
Asset Growth Ratet-1 to t ? 3.310** 0.00370 
(0.0250) (0.811) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.103 -0.0100 
(0.966) (0.566) 
Big 4 Auditor (1/0) ? -4.009 -0.000841 
(0.176) (0.934) 
Number of Analyst Following ? -0.0870 -0.000501 
(0.466) (0.584) 
External Financing Activity ? 6.179 -0.135 
(0.198) (0.252) 
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,126 1,125 
R-squared   0.621 0.246 
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Table 16 – Firm Fixed Effects 
 
This table analyzes the relation between financial reporting quality and CFO golf frequency while 
controlling for firm-fixed effects. In panel A, I repeat the analyses found in Table 12. The dependent 
variable in the first specification is ABS(Disc. Acc.), which is calculated as the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals from a modified Jones model. The dependent variable in the second specification is 
Unexplained Audit Fees, which is calculated consistent with Hribar et al (2013); higher values of UAF are 
associated with lower quality financial reporting. The variable of interest is the Number of Rounds of Golf, 
which equal to the number of rounds of golf recorded in the GHIN system by the CFO of the firm during 
the fiscal year. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. In Panel B, I repeat the analyses from 
Table 13. The dependent variable is Analyst Forecast Dispersion, which is the standard deviation of analyst 
forecast from the newest consensus forecast prior to the release of actual earnings scaled by the stock price 
at the fiscal year end.  All regressions include indicator variables for the fiscal year and firm fixed effects. 
P-values are reported in parentheses and significance is denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Coefficients with directional predictions are reported using one-tailed tests, otherwise two-tail tests are 
used. 
 
Panel A – Financial Reporting Quality with Firm Fixed Effects 
        
VARIABLES Prediction ABS(Disc. Acc.) Unexplained Audit Fees 
        
Number of Rounds of Golf + 0.000330** 0.00127** 
(0.0234) (0.0402) 
Ln(MVE) ? -0.00442 -0.0217 
(0.606) (0.568) 
Ln(MTB) ? -0.00877 -0.0240 
(0.646) (0.779) 
Leverage ? -0.0268 0.0828 
(0.325) (0.493) 
Std. Dev. CFOt-4 to t ? 0.423*** 0.707 
(0.000163) (0.148) 
ROAt ? -0.171*** -0.0714 
(2.78e-10) (0.548) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.0734*** -0.0230 
(0.000192) (0.792) 
Asset Growth Ratet-1 to t ? 0.0282*** 0.0317 
(0.000711) (0.387) 
Institutional Ownership ? -0.0357 -0.117 
(0.189) (0.331) 
Big 4 Auditor (1/0) ? 0.0674*** -0.128 
(0.00177) (0.181) 
Number of Analyst Following ? -0.000250 0.00338 
(0.679) (0.199) 
External Financing Activity ? -0.0140 -0.172 
(0.602) (0.147) 
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,091 1,095 
R-squared   0.148 0.023 
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Panel B – Analyst Dispersion with Firm Fixed Effects 
VARIABLES Prediction Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
          
Number of Rounds of Golf + 0.0000455** 0.0000455** 0.0000461** 
(0.0325) (0.0262) (0.0246) 
Number of Analyst Following ? 0.0000841* 0.0000584 0.0000635 
(0.349) (0.495) (0.459) 
Ln(MVE) ? -0.00693*** -0.00523*** -0.00539*** 
(3.30e-08) (1.48e-05) (9.57e-06) 
Loss (1/0) ? -0.00150 -0.00448*** -0.00447*** 
(0.272) (0.000793) (0.000814) 
Ln(MTB) ? 0.00829*** 0.00581** 0.00602** 
(0.00405) (0.0358) (0.0296) 
Beta ? -0.00310*** -0.00304*** -0.00310*** 
(0.00391) (0.00291) (0.00245) 
Std. Dev. CFOt-4 to t ? -0.0206 -0.0227 -0.0242 
(0.207) (0.153) (0.128) 
Big 4 Auditor (1/0) ? 0.000977 0.00130 
(0.775) (0.705) 
Consensus Horizon ? -7.30e-05** -7.21e-05** 
(0.0348) (0.0369) 
Y-o-Y Earning Surprise ? -0.0150*** -0.0146*** 
(0) (0) 
Institutional Ownership ? 0.00451 
(0.310) 
Restatement (1/0) ? 0.00186 
(0.121) 
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,094 1,076 1,076 
R-squared   0.076 0.186 0.190 
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Appendix 2 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Source(s) Definition 
ABS(Discretionary Accruals) Compustat  Absolute value of discretionary 
(residual) accruals calculated using a 
modified Jones model 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion I/B/E/S Standard Deviation of Analyst 
Forecast / Stock Price 
Asset Growth Ratet-1 to t Compustat (Total Assetst - Total Assetst-1)/Total 
Assetst 
Aud Opin  A dummy variables that is equal to 
one if the firm receives a modified 
audit opinion, and zero otherwise, 
where a modified opinion is defined 
as anything other than a standard 
unqualified audit opinion coded as 
one by Compustat; 
Beta CRSP Coefficient Estimate from Firm-
Fiscal Year Regression of firm 
excess return (Ret - RF) on the 
market risk premium (vwretd - RF) 
Big 4 Auditor (1/0) Compustat Takes value of 1 if the Compustat 
variable for auditor ("AU") is equal 
to 4, 5, 6, or 7 
Client  Square root of the number of years 
that the firm has been a client of their 
current auditor 
Consensus Horizon I/B/E/S actual_date - statpers 
Debt Compustat Sum of short-term debt and long-
term debt scaled by lagged total 
assets 
Earning Announcement CAR CRSP Cumulative Market Adjusted Return 
from day t to t+1 
External Financing Activity Compustat (SSTK-PRSTKC)/AT + (DLTIS-
DLTR+DLCCH)/AT 
FGNi,t Compustat Ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
Income Compustat Operating income after depreciation 
scaled by lagged total assets 
Institutional Ownership Thomson min(1,max(0,instown_perc)) 
IPO CRSP Indicator variable equal to one if in 
the year of the IPO 
Leverage Compustat (LT Debt + ST Debt) / Total Assets 
Lit. Risk Compustat Indicator variable equal to one for 
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high litigation risk industries, as 
defined in Francis et al. (1994). 
Ln(Assets) Compustat Log of total assets 
Ln(AUDIT FEE)i,t Audit Analytics Log of audit fee 
Ln(MTB) CRSP/Compustat (MVE+ LT Debt + ST Debt) / Total 
Assets 
Ln(MVE) CRSP Ln(ABS(prc) * shrout) 
Loss (1/0) I/B/E/S =1 if acutal_eps < 0 
Loss History Compustat A dummy variable that is equal to 
one if income before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations is 
negative in the current or two 
previous years, and zero otherwise; 
Number of Analyst Following I/B/E/S Numest 
Number of Rounds of Golf GHIN The number of rounds of golf 
recorded in the GHIN system by the 
firm's CFO during the fiscal year 
REC Compustat Receivables scaled by lagged total 
assets 
Restatement (1/0) Audit Analytics =1 if Audit Analytics reports a 
restatement being filed during the 
fiscal year 
ROA Compustat Earnings before Extraordinary Items 
/ Total Assetst-1 
Scaled Surprise I/B/E/S (Actual EPS - Consensus EPS) / Beg. 
Qtr. Stock Price 
Std. Dev. CFOt-4 to t Compustat The standard deviation of Cash Flow 
from Operations scaled by Total 
Assets for years t-4 to t 
Unexplained Audit Fee Compustat Residual from model of audit fees on 
firm characteristics (Hribar et al 
2013) 
Y-o-Y Earning Surprise I/B/E/S Actual EPSt - Actual EPSt-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
 The effort provided by the top managers of a firm has long been recognized as 
important to the performance of the organization, but the difficulty in directly measuring 
effort prevented researchers from fully exploring the impact of executive effort. In this 
dissertation, I use an observable measure of leisure consumption to proxy for the effort 
provided by the CEO and CFO of large, publically traded corporations. To measure 
individuals’ leisure consumption, I use a detailed database of golf rounds to determine the 
frequency of golf, which provides direct insight into their day-to-day leisure consumption. 
 I begin by focusing on CEOs and find that the strength of equity-based incentives 
is a significant determinant of CEO leisure consumption, which is consistent with agency 
theory. After establishing that incentives do influence the effort provided by the CEO, I 
look to firm performance to determine if high levels of leisure are detrimental to 
shareholders. Consistent with the notion that agents may “shirk” from value maximizing 
effort, I find that high levels of leisure consumption are associated with weaker firm 
performance and lower firm value. Finally, I look for evidence of monitoring by the 
directors of firms and find that directors appear to monitor the effort provided by the 
CEO, especially when the CEO is new and information asymmetries are greatest.  
 In my second essay, I focus on the importance of effort provided by CFOs by 
analyzing different aspects of financial reporting quality. CFOs are responsible for the 
systems and processes involved with financial reporting – both internal and external. 
High quality financial reporting is integral to efficient capital markets to help monitor the 
performance of firms and allocation of financial resources. I document that CFO effort is 
an important determinant of firms’ financial reporting quality and that market participants 
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are cognizant of the quality of financial reports provided by management. Specifically, I 
document that accrual usage and abnormal audit fees are lower when the CFO consumes 
less leisure. Analyst forecast dispersion is also lower when the CFO plays fewer rounds 
of golf and the time it takes to provide the market with value relevant information is 
reduced. 
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